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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a), 63-46b-16(l) and 34A-2-801(8)(a).1 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission have jurisdiction to decide 
Ms. Chambers' claim for workers' compensation benefits? 
Standard of review: Section 63-46b-16(4)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act ("UAPA" hereafter; Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Ann. 1997) provides that this Court 
may grant relief in those cases where "the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred 
by any statuteQ" Whether the Appeals Board acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction in this 
case is a question of general law that will be decided by the Court under a correction of error 
standard. King v. Industrial Com'n. 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1992.); State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
2. Is the Appeals Board entitled to substitute its own findings for those of the ALJ? 
Standard of review: Here, Red Cliffs Regional Convalescence Center and Business 
Insurance Company (referred to jointly as "Red Cliffs" hereafter) challenges the Appeals 
Board's adherence to proper decision-making processes. Section 63-46b-16(4)(e) of UAPA 
allows this Court to grant relief where "the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
I 
At the time of Ms. Chamber's work accident, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act was 
codified as Title 35, Chapter 1. Later, on July 1, 1997, the Act was recodified as Title 34A, 
Chapter 2. Although certain procedural changes were included in the recodification, no 
substantive changes were made. This brief cites to the Act as recodified after July 1, 1997. 
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decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedureQ" The Court will apply 
a "correction of error" standard to this question of general law. King v. Industrial Com'n. 850 
P.2d at 1285; Stgtg_v. Pena. 869 P.2d at 936. 
3. Are the Appeals Board's findings in this case supported by substantial evidence? 
Standard of review: Section 67>-46Y>-\6{4XB) oi \3A? A aitows tYns Court to giant 
relief where "the agency action is based upon a determination of facts, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the CourtQ" The Court will therefore apply a "substantial evidence" standard of review 
in evaluating the Appeals Board's findings of fact. King v. Industrial Com'n. 850 P.2d at 
1285. 
4. Were Petitioners Red Cliffs entitled to a second evidentiary hearing? 
Standard of review: Red Cliffs contends its constitutional right to due process was 
violated because it did not receive a second evidentiary hearing on issues surrounding Ms. 
Chambers eligibility for temporary disability compensation. As discussed in Point Four of this 
brief, Red Cliffs foiled to preserve this issue for judicial review. However, if the Court 
concludes that this issue is properly before it, then §63-46b-16(4)(e) of UAPA allows the 
Court to grant relief where "the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, of has failed to follow prescribed procedure^)" The Court will apply a 
"correction of error" standard to this question of general law. King v. Industrial Com'n. 850 
P.2d at 1285; Statevi_Pena? 869 P.2d at 936. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statues are determinative of the issues raised in this proceeding. They 
are set forth in full in Appendix A of this brief. 
34A-1-205. Appeals Board 
34A-1-303. Review of administrative decision - Chair - Appointment - Compensation 
- Qualifications.. 
34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
34A-2-410. Temporary disability 
34A-2-411. Temporary partial disability - Amount of payments. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: Red Cliffs seeks judicial review of the Appeals Board's 
award of temporary partial disability compensation and medical benefits to Ms. Chambers, 
pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act" hereafter). 
FACTS: Red Cliffs is a rehabilitation convalescence center. Ms. Chambers began 
work there as a nurse's aid on November 26, 1996. (R. 1) Her duties included helping 
patients with all their daily activities. (T. 12)2 During the same period that Ms. Chambers was 
employed at Red Cliffs, she also worked at Washington County ARC ("ARC" hereafter), 
where she performed similar duties. (T. 16) 
2 
The transcript of the evidentiary hearing is found in Volume 3 of the Commission's 
record. Because the pages of the hearing transcript are numbered separately from the 
other pages of the record, this brief refer to specific pages of the hearing transcript as 
numbered in the transcript itself. 
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On January 18, 1997, at Red Cliffs, Ms. Chambers was working alone, assisting an 
elderly patient who was immobile and unable to talk. (T. 17) Ms. Chambers had just finished 
transferring the patient from the patient's bed to a wheelchair when the patient began to fall 
forward. (T. 18) Ms. Chambers caught the patient, but then fell backward with the patient on 
top of her. (T. 18,22) She immediately felt pain in her back (T. 22,25), but was able to return 
the patient to the wheel chair. (T. 23) 
Ms. Chambers did not report her accident to management because she had nearly been 
fired for poor attendance a few days earlier and felt her job was at risk. (T. 25, 27,45, 46) 
Later that same day, after she left work, her back pain grew worse. She sought medical 
attention that evening at the local hospital emergency room. (T. 27, 51) She told the treating 
physician that she had hurt her back at work while lifting a patient. The physician diagnosed 
a "lifting injury with back strain and muscle spasm" and prescribed medication, cold 
compresses and physical therapy. (R. 162) The physician also indicated Ms. Chambers could 
return to light duty work on January 20, 1997. (R. 2) 
At the time of her accident, Ms. Chambers had been working at Red Cliffs for only one 
month and was unfamiliar with other staff. (T. 29) Shortly after her accident, she telephoned 
Red Cliffs and spoke to a man on duty who she believed was Val Penman (T. 28) She was told 
to bring a physician's note to Red Cliffs within three days. (T. 28) Mr. Penman's testimony 
establishes it was not he who received Ms. Chambers' call. (T. 103 ) However, Red Cliffs 
itself notified the Commission that on January 20,1997, Ms. Chambers had reported a work-
related accident that had occurred as a "patient started to fall." (R. 1) 
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On January 20,1997, Ms. Chambers was examined by Dr. Jensen. Ms. Chambers told 
Dr. Jensen that she had "injured her back on January 18, 1997 while lifting a patient." Dr. 
Jensen diagnosed "lumbar strain, work related injury." He advised her that the injury might 
take several weeks to improve and placed her on "restricted duty." (R, 67) 
Ms. Chambers later telephoned Red Cliffs to report she had been released to light duty 
work. She was instructed to speak to an individual named "Mona." However, "Mona" was 
not available at the times Ms. Chambers called, and "Mona" did not return her calls. (T. 32) 
On January 31,1997, Dr. Root, an orthopedist, examined Ms. Chambers. She told Dr. 
Root she had injured her back while working at Red Cliffs on January 18,1997, while "lifting 
a patient out of her chair." (R. 136) Dr. Root diagnosed a "lumbosacral as well as cervical and 
upper thoracic strain/sprain injury with superimposed degenerative disc/spine disease in the 
lumbar spine." He recommended continuing physical therapy and limited Ms. Chambers to 
"modified light duty work." (R. 138) 
Dr. Root examined Ms. Chambers again on February 7, 1997. He stressed the 
importance of physical therapy to Ms. Chambers and continued her on light duty work 
restrictions. (R. 140) When Dr. Root saw Ms. Chambers again, on March 25, 1997, she 
reported occasional "flare ups" of back pain and a recent strain from her work at ARC. (R. 
142.) 
On February 27,1997, Dr. Green examined Ms. Chambers at Dr. Root's request. Ms. 
Chambers told Dr. Green she had started having back pain on January 18,1997, after lifting 
a patient at Red Cliffs. Dr. Green diagnosed "neck and back pain, 1 Vi months post injury." 
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He discussed "strict activity limits" with Ms. Chambers. (R. 145,146) As of March 20, 1997, 
Dr. Green had still not released Ms. Chambers to full duty work. (R. 148) 
Ms. Chambers received medical care during August 1997 from Dr. Gunn, a 
chiropractor. (T. 82) He diagnosed her as suffering from "acute traumatic lumbar and cervical 
sprains, with paravertibral splinting, bilateral sciatic neuritis and subocciptal frontal 
cephalalgia" related to her employment at Red Cliffs on January 18, 1997. (R. 61) 
During the period in question, Ms. Chambers qualified for Medicaid and had a 
Medicaid card. (R. I l l , 119, 126) She testified she was unable to continue some medical 
treatment because she had no money. (T. 38) She was uncertain whether Medicaid would pay 
for treatment of work related injuries, but believed it had, in fact, paid her medical bills (T. 
64) 
After her accident at Red Cliffs, Ms. Chambers continued to work at her second job 
with ARC (T. 32, 52) Her work at ARC did not require any lifting and, therefore, was within 
the light duty restrictions established by the various physicians. (T. 33) Other ARC employees 
confirm that Ms. Chambers told them of her accident at Red Cliffs. (87, 90, 97) They also 
confirm that, after the accident, Ms. Chambers suffered from continuing back problems until 
she left her employment at ARC in August 1997. (T. 89, 99) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION: Because Red Cliffs alleges 
various procedural errors, the course of proceedings before the ALJ and Appeals Board are set 
forth below in detail. 
On June 5, 1997, Ms. Chambers filed an application to obtain workers' compensation 
benefits for injuries arising from an alleged work related accident January 18, 1997 at Red 
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Cliffs. (R. 5) Red Cliffs filed its answer denying liability for Ms. Chambers' claim, on the 
grounds Ms. Chambers had not been involved in the alleged work accident. Alternatively, 
Red Cliffs argued that even if there had been an accident, Ms. Chambers was not disabled 
from the accident. Red Cliffs further alleged that Ms. Chambers was ineligible for temporary 
disability compensation because she had refused Red Cliffs' offer of appropriate light duty 
work. (R. 34) Later, Red Cliffs identified Ms. Penta and Ms. Whall as individuals with 
information supporting Red Cliffs' defenses to Ms. Chambers' claim. (R. 50, 51) 
The Commission scheduled a plenary hearing for February 26, 1998 "to hear and 
dispose of (Ms. Chambers') application." (R. 58) At the hearing, conducted by a Labor 
Commission ALJ, Red Cliffs' attorney presented an opening statement in which he reiterated 
Red Cliffs' defenses, including the arguments that even if Ms. Chambers had been involved 
in the alleged accident at work, she was not disabled, and that she had declined Red Cliffs' 
offer of light duty work. (T. 9) Red Cliffs' attorney concluded his opening remarks by arguing 
that, at best, Ms. Chambers was entitled to only a limited period of disability compensation. 
(T.10) 
During the hearing, Ms. Chambers testified on her own behalf (T. 10-84) and also 
called Nancy Stewart (T. 85-94) and Kelli Cottam (T. 94-101) as witnesses. Red Cliffs called 
only one witness, Val Penman. (Transcript 101-108). At the end of the hearing, the ALJ did 
not announce his decision. Instead, he told the parties he would review the record and issue 
a written decision. (T. 126) 
The ALJ issued his decision on May 27,1998, concluding Ms. Chambers had not been 
involved in any accident at Red Cliffs. Because the ALJ denied Ms. Chambers' claim on this 
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threshold issue, he did not address other secondary issues, such as medical and legal causation 
or the extent and duration of Ms. Chambers' disability. (Appendix B; R. 236-242) 
In a timely motion for review, Ms. Chambers asked "the Board" to reverse the ALJ's 
decision and find instead that she had been injured in a work-related accident at Red Cliffs. 
(Appendix C; R. 246) 
On September 1, 1998, the Appeals Board issued its decision on Ms. Chambers' 
motion for review. The Appeals Board found that Ms. Chambers had been involved in an 
accident at Red Cliffs. The Appeal Board therefore remanded Ms. Chambers' claim to the 
ALJ "to resolve issues of legal and medical causation and the benefits due Ms. Chambers, if 
any." (Appendix D; R. 261-263) 
On September 15, 1998, Red Cliffs filed a "motion for reconsideration" with the 
Appeals Board. (Appendix E; R. 265-271) On September 16, 1998, Commission counsel 
advised Red Cliffs that, pursuant to §63-46b-13 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
reconsideration was available only for decisions that constituted final agency action. Because 
the Appeals Board had remanded Ms. Chambers' case for further proceedings, no final agency 
action had yet been taken. Consequently, Red Cliffs request for reconsideration was 
premature. (R. 273) 
On September 17, 1998, in response to the Appeals Board's remand, the ALJ issued 
his second order. In the order, the ALJ noted the Appeals Board's prior determination that Ms. 
Chambers had been involved in an accident at Red Cliffs. With that threshold issue decided, 
the ALJ concluded that Ms. Chambers was entitled to medical benefits and temporary partial 
disability compensation from January 19 through August 25,1997. (Appendix F; R. 274-277). 
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On October 1, 1998, Red Cliffs filed a motion for review of the ALJ's second order, 
arguing that: 1) The Appeals Board had erred in setting aside the ALJ's original finding that 
Ms. Chambers had not been involved in a work-related accident; 2) Even if the accident did 
occur, Ms. Chambers was subject to the "higher" Allen test3 for legal causation and could not 
meet that test; 3) Even if Ms. Chambers met the higher Allen test, her injuries were not 
disabling; 4) Ms. Chambers was not entitled to disability compensation because she had 
refused Red Cliffs' offer of light duty work; and 5) In any event, Ms. Chambers was not 
entitled to medical benefits or disability compensation benefits after March 25, 1997. 
(Appendix G; R. 282-296)4 
On October 16,1998, Ms. Chambers replied to Red Cliffs' motion for Review. (R. 297-
298) She ended her reply with a request that "the Administrative Law Judge, or alternatively, 
the Appeals Board, deny (Red Cliffs') motion." (Appendix H; R. 298) 
In a decision issued on November 10,1998, the Appeals Board reaffirmed its previous 
finding that Ms. Chambers had been involved in a work accident at Red Cliffs. The Appeals 
Board applied the higher Allen test of legal causation to Ms. Chambers' claim, but concluded 
that she successfully met that test. Likewise, the Appeals Board found that Ms. Chambers had 
also established medical causation. The Appeals Board also concluded that Red Cliffs did not 
have light duty work available for Ms. Chambers, or offer her such light duty work after her 
work-related accident. The Appeals Board therefore affirmed the ALJ's award of medical 
3Allen v. Ind. Comm.. 729 P.2d 15 (Ut. 1986) 
4 
The order of Red Cliffs' arguments has been modified to state the arguments in a logical 
sequence. 
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benefits and temporary partial disability compensation to Ms. Chambers. (Appendix I; R. 307-
311) 
On November 24,1998, Red Cliffs asked the Appeals Board to reconsider its decision. 
Red Cliffs renewed the argument that Ms. Chambers was not entitled to disability 
compensation after March 27, 1997. Red Cliffs also objected to the Appeals Board's exercise 
of jurisdiction over "this last Motion for Review" on the grounds that the parties had not 
requested review by the Appeals Board. (Appendix J; R. 313-316) 
The Appeals Board denied Red Cliffs' request for reconsideration on January 14,1999. 
The Appeals Board ruled that Ms. Chambers had properly invoked the Appeals Board's 
jurisdiction. The Appeals Board dismissed Red Cliffs argument that Ms. Chambers was not 
disabled after March 27, 1997 by pointing out that the record lacked any evidence she had 
recovered by March 27, 1997. (Appendix K; R. 325-327) 
Red Cliffs then sought appellate judicial review by filing a petition for review with this 
Court. (R. 328,329) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After the ALJ denied her claim to workers' compensation benefits, Ms. Chambers 
exercised her right under §34A-l-303 of the Utah Labor Commission Act to obtain Appeals 
Board review of the ALJ's decision. In reviewing the ALJ's decision, the Appeals Board 
exercised the authority granted by §34A-l-303(4), and supported by prior decisions of Utah's 
appellate courts, and entered its own findings of fact. Specifically, the Appeals Board found 
that Ms. Chambers had been injured in an accident while working at Red Cliffs and that she 
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was entitled to payment of medical benefits and temporary partial disability compensation 
during the period of her recovery. 
Although Red Cliffs argues the Appeals Board's findings of fact are in error, Red 
Cliffs has failed to discharge its obligation to demonstrate such error by marshaling the entire 
evidence. In fact, the Appeals Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence when 
the record is viewed in its entirety. 
Red Cliffs also argues it was denied due process by the Appeals Board's refusal to 
allow it a second hearing to present evidence regarding Ms. Chambers' right to disability 
compensation. However, Red Cliffs failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. 
Furthermore, because Red Cliffs had full and fair opportunity to present its evidence at the 
first hearing, it was not entitled to a second hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE APPEALS BOARD PROPERLY EXERCISED 
JURISDICTION OVER MS. CHAMBERS' CLAIM FOR WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS. 
Red Cliffs asserts that the "the Commissioner, not the Appeals Board, should have had 
jurisdiction to review the administrative law judge's denial of (Ms. Chambers' claim for 
benefits . . . ."5 This assertion is in error. In fact, the Appeals Board properly exercised 
jurisdiction in this matter as provided by §34A-l-303 of the Utah Labor Commission Act. 
As background to this issue, prior to July 1,1997, motions to review an ALJ's decision 
in workers' compensation cases were decided by the three members of the Utah Industrial 
See Red Cliffs' initial brief, page 17, footnote 2. 
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Commission. See Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 (1994 Repl.) Then, effective July 1, 1997, 
the Industrial Commission was replaced by the Labor Commission, administered by a single 
Commissioner. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-201 (1997 Repl.) However, at the same time, 
the legislature created the Appeals Board, thereby allowing parties to obtain final adjudicative 
action from a panel that was insulated from political pressures by fixed term appointments, 
balanced between the interests of employers and employees, and also balanced between 
political parties. Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-205. In these respects the Appeals Board was 
similar to the former Industrial Commission. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 (1994 Repl.) 
The legislature also established the manner in which the either party could invoke the 
Appeals Board's jurisdiction. Section 34A-l-303(3) provides: 
A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the Appeals Board 
by filing the request with the Division of Adjudication: 
(a) as part of the motion for review; or 
(b) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for review, 
within 20 days of the date of the motion for review is filed with the Division 
of Adjudication. 
Section 303(3) requires no particular formality. All that is required is a timely "request" by 
any party. 
In this case, Ms. Chambers made the requests necessary to invoke the Appeals Board's 
jurisdiction . After the ALJ's first decision, in which he concluded there had been no work-
related accident, Ms. Chambers filed a timely motion for review in which she asked that the 
ALJ's decision be reversed and that "the Board'Tind she had been injured in a work related 
accident at Red Cliffs. (Appendix C; R. 246) Then, after Red Cliffs' moved for review of the 
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ALJ's second decision, Ms. Chambers requested that "the Administrative Law Judge, or 
alternatively, the Appeals Board, deny (Red Cliffs') motion" (Appendix H; R. 298) 
In light of Ms. Chambers' timely requests for review of the ALJ's decisions by the 
Appeals Board, §34A-l-303 of the Utah Labor Commission Act granted the Appeals Board 
jurisdiction to conduct such reviews. 
POINT TWO: STATUTE AND APPELLATE PRECEDENT ALLOW 
THE APPEALS BOARD TO SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN FINDINGS FOR 
THOSE OF THE ALJ. 
In its first decision in this matter, the Appeals Board found that Mrs. Chambers had 
been involved in an accident while working at Red Cliffs. In making this finding, the Appeals 
Board reversed the ALJ's determination that there had been no such accident. Red Cliffs 
argues the Appeals Board cannot substitute its findings of fact for those of the ALJ. Red 
Cliffs' argument is unsupported by either statute or appellate precedent. 
Section 34A-1-303(4) of the Utah Labor Commission Act establishes the Appeals 
Board's authority to substitute its judgment in proceedings to review an ALJ's decision: 
(a)On appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board may: 
(i) affirm the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(ii) modify the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(iii) return the case to an administrative law judge for further action as directed; 
or 
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decisions of an administrative law 
judge. 
As applicable to Ms/ Chambers' claim, the Appeals Board based its decision on 
evidence the parties had previously submitted. Based on that evidence, the Appeals Board 
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reversed the ALJ's finding that no work-related accident had occurred. The Appeals Board's 
action was specifically authorized by §34A-2-303(4)(a). 
Not only is the Appeals Board's fact finding authority established by the plain 
language of §34A-2-303(4), it is also supported by a long line of Utah appellate court 
decisions. 
In United States Steel v. Industrial Com'n. 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court dealt with facts very similar to the facts of Ms. Chambers' claim. In United 
States SteeL after an evidentiary hearing on an injured worker's claim for disability 
compensation, the ALJ viewed the injured worker as not credible, found no work accident had 
occurred, and denied compensation. The injured worker moved for review by the Industrial 
Commission. Based on the record of the hearing conducted by the ALJ, the Industrial 
Commission found that the injured worker had been involved in an accident at work. 
On appeal, U.S. Steel argued it was improper for the Commission to substitute its 
findings for those of the ALJ, particularly when the ALJ had based his findings on the 
credibility of a witness. The Supreme Court rejected U.S. Steel's argument: 
Our statutes do not mandate or indicate that the Commission is bound 
by the findings of the Administrative Law Judge when the evidence is 
conflicting. On the contrary, Section 35-1-82.54 provides that when a case is 
referred to the full Commission, it shall review the entire record, and may 
make its own findings of fact and enter its award thereon. In doing so it may, 
in its discretion, take further evidence. Though this Court cannot overturn the 
findings of fact made by the Commission if there is substantial evidence 
furnishing a reasonable basis for such findings, there is nothing in our statutes 
which limits the power of the Commission itself in reviewing and adopting or 
reversing the findings of its Administrative Law Judge (Citations omitted.) 
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Since then, Utah appellate courts have consistently held that an ALJ's findings are not 
binding in later agency review proceedings. Giles v. Industrial Commission. 967 P.2d 743, 
745 (Utah 1984); USX Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah App. 1989); 
Virgin v. Board of Review. 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah App. 1990); Chase v. Industrial 
Commission. 872 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah App. 1994); Commercial Carriers v. Industrial 
Commission. 888 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah App. 1994).6 
These Utah appellate decisions are consistent with the majority rule in other states. As 
noted by Professor Larson in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. §80.12(b), p. 15-565: 
It also follows logically that the rule of conclusiveness of 
administrative findings of fact should apply to the final action of the Director 
or full Board, rather than the decision of the referee. . . . The fact that the 
Commission took no new evidence is immaterial. Moreover, in states adhering 
to the orthodox rule, no exception is made even when the issue is credibility 
of a witness, and when only the referee and not the Commission had the 
benefit of first hand observation of the witness. 
Red Cliffs has cited appellate decisions from other jurisdictions to support its argument 
that the Appeals Board cannot substitute its findings of fact for those of the ALJ. As argued 
by Red Cliffs, Rhode Island and Wisconsin belong to a minority of states that limit a review 
board's ability to set aside an ALJ's findings of fact when such facts are based on a credibility 
determination. See Moreno v. Nulco, 591 A.2d 788 (R.I. 1991) and Hakes v. Labor and 
Since July 1,1997 the Appeals Board has replaced the Industrial Commission as the 
final agency adjudicator (in cases where a party has elected Appeals Board review). 
In that regard, the Appeals Board's function is analogous to that of the former 
Industrial Commission at the time the above cited cases were decided. 
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Industry Review Com'n. 523 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. App. 1994). However, Red Cliffs' reliance 
on precedent from other jurisdictions is misplaced. 
In Adams v. Industrial Commission. 710 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. App. 1985), the Arizona 
court was not addressing the authority of a review board to substitute its findings for those of 
the ALJ. Rather, the question presented to the Arizona court was whether a replacement ALJ 
could substitute his or her credibility findings for those of the original ALJ. Furthermore, the 
Arizona court was dealing with a workers' compensation system in which the ALJ's decision 
constitutes final agency action. The only additional agency action available is review by the 
ALJ.7 Such a system is not comparable to Utah's system, which does provide for additional 
agency action. 
In connection with its discussion of the Adams case, Red Cliffs also referenced the 
federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Pigrenet v. Boland Marine & 
Manufacturing. 631 F.2d 1190 ( 5th Cir. 1980). Pigrenet also dealt with a replacement ALJ's 
power to substitute his or her credibility findings for those of the ALJ who conducted the 
hearing. However, the entire Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, set aside the first 
Pigrenet decision on the grounds the question of the substitute ALJ's authority had not been 
7 
The Arizona process was explained in Ohlmaier v. Industrial Commission. 776 P. 2d 791, 
794 (Ariz. 1999): 
In 1973, the Arizona legislature amended the method of adjudicating contested claims and 
provided the opportunity for review of an administrative law judge's decision. That review 
is by the same administrative law judge who heard the contested claim The award is then 
final No longer does the commission itself review awards. To obtain relief from the award, 
the aggrieved party must petition the court of appeals for review. (Citation omitted.) 
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preserved for appeal. See Pigrenet v. Boland Marine & Manufacturing Company. 656 P.2d 
1091 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Nor does the California case Rubalcava v. W.C.A.B.. 269 Cal. Rptr. 656 
(Ca.App.2Dist. 1990), support Red Cliffs' argument. To the contrary, in Rubalcava. the 
California court applied the same rule that is followed in Utah: 
Preliminarily, we note the Board is empowered on reconsideration to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence, to make its own credibility determinations, 
and to reject the findings of the WCJ (Workers' Compensation Judge) and 
enter its own findings on the basis of its review of the record; nevertheless, any 
award, order, or decision of the Board must be supported by substantial 
evidence in light of the entire record. (Citations omitted.) 
Rubalcava v. W.C.A.B.. 269 Cal. Rptr. at 659. 
In summary, it may be true that a minority of states limit appeals boards from 
substituting their findings of fact on credibility issues for the findings of the ALJ. But Utah 
follows the majority rule, which permits the Appeals Board to substitute its findings of fact 
for those of the ALJ so long as the Appeals Board's findings are supported by substantial 
evidence from the record as a whole. 
POINT THREE: THE APPEALS BOARD'S FINDINGS ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A. Red Cliffs Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence. 
Red Cliffs challenges the Appeals Board's findings that 1) Ms. Chambers was involved 
in an accident while working at Red Cliffs; 2) that she remained partially disabled until August 
1997; and that 3) Red Cliffs did not offer her light duty work. 
On review, appellate courts apply a "substantial evidence" standard to such factual 
issues. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). In applying this standard, 
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appellate courts insist that the party challenging the agency's findings of fact "must marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989.) If a 
party fails to discharge its burden of marshaling the evidence, the reviewing appellate court 
accepts the Appeals Board's findings as conclusive. Meiriam v. Board of Review. 812 P.2d 
447? 459 (Utah App. 1991). In this case, Red Cliffs failed to marshal the evidence which 
supports the Appeals Board's findings. 
For example, what Red Cliffs' brief labels as "uncontested facts" does not discuss the 
record of Ms. Chambers' consistent descriptions of her accident, given to several different 
physicians over a period of several weeks. Red Cliffs ignored the testimony of Ms. Stewart 
and Ms. Cottam. Red Cliffs did not mention the medical treatment Ms. Chambers received 
from Dr. Gunn during August, 1997. Red Cliffs ignores Ms. Chambers' testimony that she 
never received an offer of light duty work from Red Cliffs. 
Instead of addressing this evidence, which supports the Appeals Board's findings of 
fact, Red Cliffs merely repeats only such evidence as it believes supports its theory of the 
case. In turning a blind eye to all contrary evidence, Red Cliffs has failed to discharge its 
burden of marshaling the evidence. Consequently, the Appeals Board's findings should be 
considered conclusive. 
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B. Substantial Evidence Supports The Appeals Board's Findings. 
As discussed above, it is Red Cliffs burden to marshal the evidence in this matter. 
However, because Red Cliffs has failed to discharge that burden, the Labor Commission will 
identify the evidence that supports its findings of fact with respect to Ms. Chambers' claim. 
The accident: The threshold issue in this case is whether Ms. Chambers was involved 
in an accident at Red Cliffs on January 18, 1997. Ms. Chambers was able to describe the 
accident in detail. Nothing about the manner in which the accident occurred was implausible. 
(T. 17-28) Red Cliffs submitted no evidence that contradicted Ms. Chambers' account of the 
accident. Ms. Chambers sought medical attention for her back injury the same day that the 
accident occurred. (R. 162) Later, Ms. Chambers consistently gave the same account of her 
accident to each of her several medical providers. (R. 61, 64,136, 145) Her co-workers at 
ARC corroborate that Ms. Chambers began suffering back pain at the time of her accident and 
that she told them she had hurt her back in the accident at Red Cliffs. (T. 87, 97) 
Against the foregoing evidence, all supporting Ms. Chambers' claim, Red Cliffs 
contends Ms. Chambers has lied about her accident. In particular, Red Cliffs references Ms. 
Chambers' delay in reporting the accident to Red Cliffs. However, Ms. Chambers has 
explained that, because her job at Red Cliffs was in jeopardy due to poor attendance, she 
feared she would be fired if she reported that she had been involved in an accident with a 
patient. (T. 25) In any event, the record is clear that Ms. Chambers did report the accident to 
Red Cliffs on the first business day after the accident. (R. 1) 
Red Cliffs also points to Ms. Chambers' inconsistent statement on the question of 
whether her medical expenses for her work-related injuries had been paid by Medicaid. 
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However, Ms. Chambers' confusion over the complexities of the relationship between medical 
coverage under the workers' compensation system and the Medicaid system is not surprising. 
Furthermore, if any probative connection exists between Ms. Chambers' confusion over 
medical coverage and the issue of whether she had been involved a work accident several 
months earlier, that connection is extremely tenuous. The Appeals Board concluded that Ms. 
Chambers' confusion did not justify ignoring the other evidence that established the accident 
had occurred, particularly where that evidence was uncontradicted. 
Duration of partially disability: Red Cliffs contends Ms. Chambers was not disabled 
after March 1997. However, every physician who saw Ms. Chambers after her work accident 
concluded she was unable to perform full duty work. (R. 67, 138, 146, 148) Ms. Chambers 
testified that she could not perform full duty work. (T. 35) Her co-workers at ARC testified 
she could not perform full duty work. (T. 88, 98) Finally, Dr. Gunn, who saw her during late 
August 1997, concluded she was still suffering from acute traumatic lumbar and cervical 
sprains, as a result of her work accident. (R. 61) There is no affirmative evidence in the record 
that Ms. Chambers was able to resume full duty work until August 1997, when she certified 
on an application for unemployment insurance that she was able to perform full duty work. 
(T. 80) 
Offer of light duty work: Finally, Red Cliffs argues Ms. Chambers is not entitled to 
temporary partial disability compensation because she "refused to perform light duty work"8 
at Red Cliffs. However, during the hearing in this matter, Red Cliffs presented no evidence 
8 
See Red Cliffs' brief, page 26. 
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whatsoever that it had light duty work available, or that it offered light duty work to Ms. 
Chambers. To the contrary, Ms. Chambers testified she attempted to arrange light duty work 
at Red Cliffs, but her telephone calls were not returned. (T. 31, 32") Ms. Chambers' testimony 
on this point is uncontradicted. 
In summary, because Red Cliffs failed to fulfill its obligation to marshal the evidence 
regarding Ms. Chambers' claim for workers' compensation benefits, the Court should accept 
the Appeals Board's findings of fact as conclusive. But in any event, substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole supports the Appeals Board's findings that: 1) Ms. Chambers was 
involved in a work accident at Red Cliffs on January 18,1997; 2) Ms. Chambers was not able 
to return to full duty work until August 1997; and 3) Red Cliffs did not offer light duty work 
to Ms. Chambers after her accident. 
POINT FOUR: AT THE FIRST EVIDENTIARY HEARING IN THIS 
MATTER, RED CLIFFS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE REGARDING MS. CHAMBERS' RIGHT TO 
TEMPORARY DISABILITY COMPENSATION. RED CLIFFS IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO A SECOND HEARING ON THAT ISSUE. 
A. Red Cliffs Did Not Raise This Issue In Proceedings Before the 
Commission. Because Red Cliffs Failed To Exhaust Its Administrative 
Remedies, This Court Has No Jurisdiction To Consider This Issue. 
In the course of proceeding before the Appeals Board, Red Cliffs filed a response to 
Ms. Chambers' motion for review (R. 248), a premature motion for review (Appendix E; R. 
265), a timely motion for review (Appendix G; R. 282); and finally, a request for 
reconsideration (Appendix J; R. 313). At no time did Red Cliffs request a second evidentiary 
hearing. Consequently, the Appeals Board had no opportunity to address that issue. 
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Issues not raised before an administrative agency or trial court cannot later be raised 
for the first time on appeal. James v. Preston, et aL 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987); Rekward 
v. Industrial Comm'n. 755 P.2d 166 (Utah App. 1988). See also Judge Bench's concurring 
opinion in Espinal v. SL Citv Bd. of Education. 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990). 
While the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Com'n. 
681 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1984), that certain exceptional cases might not be subject to the 
foregoing rule, there is nothing about Red Cliffs' argument that could not have been addressed 
by the Appeals Board. Red Cliffs could have raised the issue, but simply did not. 
Consequently, this Court should decline to consider it now. 
B. Red Cliffs Had Full Opportunity At The First Evidentiary Hearing To 
Present Evidence On Ms. Chambers' Right To Temporary Disability 
Compensation. Red Cliffs Is Not Entitled To A Second Hearing On That 
Issue. 
Assuming for discussion that Red Cliffs has preserved its argument for another 
evidentiary hearing for consideration by this Court, Red Cliffs' argument is without merit. 
The Commission and Appeals Board do not dispute Red Cliffs' right to an evidentiary hearing 
regarding Ms. Chambers' claim for temporary disability compensation. However, nothing 
entitles Red Cliffs to two evidentiary hearings. 
The ALJ conducted a plenary evidentiary hearing on February 26, 1998. Red Cliffs 
participated in that hearing. But now, Red Cliffs contends it was unnecessary to present its 
evidence at that time. According to Red Cliffs:9 
9 
Red Cliffs, brief, page 21 
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The administrative law judge initially found that because of the applicant's 
lack of credibility, there was no industrial accident. Therefore, there was no 
need for Red Cliff to present any evidence regarding the applicant's claim for 
temporary disability payments. However, the Appeals Board reversed the 
decision of the administrative law judge and remanded the case for a 
determination of both legal and medical causation. On remand, the 
administrative law judge found that the applicant was entitled to temporary 
partial disability payments through August 25, 1997. (R. 274-278). This was 
done without giving Red Cliffs the opportunity for a hearing that would have 
allowed them to present evidence that refuted the applicant's claim for 
temporary disability payments.... 
The foregoing summary by Red Cliffs is not factually correct. Prior to the evidentiary 
hearing of February 26, 1998, Red Cliffs recognized that Ms. Chambers' claim to disability 
compensation was an issue to be litigated. (See Red Cliffs' answer to Ms. Chambers' 
application, R. 33-36): also see Red Cliffs' answers to interrogatories, R. 43-56) Then, at the 
beginning of the evidentiary hearing, Red Cliffs' attorney specifically identified Ms. 
Chambers' claim to disability compensation, and the duration of such compensation, as issues 
before the ALJ. (T. 9, 10) During the hearing that followed, the ALJ allowed Red Cliffs to 
fully present all its evidence. At no time during the hearing did the ALJ indicate that he 
intended to find Ms. Chambers had not been involved in any accident. To the contrary, after 
both parties had rested, the ALJ advised them he would review the record and issue a written 
decision. (T. 126) Under these circumstances, Red Cliffs had fair opportunity to present 
evidence on Ms. Chambers' claim for temporary disability compensation, an issue that Red 
Cliffs fully understood was pending before the ALJ. In not presenting its evidence on that 
issue, Red Cliffs relied on its own judgment and strategy. The fact that such judgment and 
strategy has proved unwise is not a basis for allowing Red Cliffs a second evidentiary hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
As authorized by §34A-l-303(3) of the Utah Labor Commission Act, Ms. Chambers 
properly invoked the jurisdiction of the Appeals Board in this matter. Then, consistent with 
§34A-1-303(4) of that Act, the Appeals Board carefully considered the entire record and 
concluded Ms. Chambers had been injured in a work-related accident at Red Cliffs and was 
entitled to the medical benefits and temporary partial disability compensation provided by the 
Utah Workers'Compensation Act. 
The procedures followed by the ALJ and the Appeals Board provided both parties full 
and fair opportunity to present their evidence and arguments. The Appeals Board's 
determinations of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole; the 
Appeals Board's application of procedural and substantive law has been correct. 
The Appeals Board respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the 
Appeals Board and deny Red Cliffs' petition for review. 
Dated this j i ^ d a y of June, 1999. 
ALlLox 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Utah Labor Commission 
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Tab A 
34A-2-411. Temporary partial disability - Amount of payments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive 
weekly compensation equal to: 
(a) 66 2/3% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the 
accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not more 
than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, but only up to a total weekly compensation 
that does not exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury. 
(2) The commission may order an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time 
prior to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 34A-2-417. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than 
eight years after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate when the disability ends or 
the injured employee dies. 
34A-1-205. Appeals Board - Chair - Appointment - Compensation - Qualifications. 
(1) There is created the Appeals Board within the commission consisting of three members. 
The board may call and preside at adjudicative proceedings to review an order or decision 
that is subject to review by the Appeals Board under this title. 
(2) (a) The governor shall appoint the members with the advice and consent of the Senate 
and in accordance with this section. 
(b) One member of the board shall be appointed to represent employers, in making this 
appointment, the governor shall consider nominations from employer organizations. 
(c) One member of the board shall be appointed to represent employees, in making this 
appointment, the governor shall consider nominations from employee organizations. 
(d) No more than two members may belong to the same political party. 
(3) (a) The term of a member shall be six years beginning on March 1 of the year the 
member is appointed, except that the governor shall, at the time of appointment or 
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that the terms of members are staggered 
so that one member is appointed every two years. 
(b) The governor may remove a member only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance 
or misfeasance in office, or other good and sufficient cause. 
(c) A member shall hold office until a successor is appointed and has qualified. 
(4) A member shall be part-time and receive compensation as provided by Title 67, Chapter 
19, State Personnel Management Act. 
(5) (a) The chief officer of the board shall be the chair, who shall serve as the executive and 
administrative head of the board. 
(b) The governor shall appoint and may remove at will the chair from the position of chair. 
(6) A majority of the board shall constitute a quorum to transact business. 
(7) (a) The commission shall provide the Appeals Board necessary staff support, except as 
provided in Subsection (7)(b). 
(b) At the request of the Appeals Board, the attorney general shall act as an impartial aid to 
the Appeals Board in outlining the facts and the issues. 
34A-1-303. Review of administrative decision. 
(1) A decision entered by an administrative law judge under this title is the final order of the 
commission unless a further appeal is initiated under this title and in accordance with the 
rules of the commission governing the review. 
(2) (a) Unless otherwise provided, a person who is entitled to appeal a decision of an 
administrative law judge under this title, may appeal the decision by filing a motion for 
review with the Division of Adjudication. 
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests in accordance with Subsection (3) that the 
appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review in accordance 
with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. A decision of the commissioner 
is a final order of the commission unless set aside by the court of appeals. 
(c) (i) If in accordance with Subsection (3) a party in interest to the appeal requests that the 
appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the Appeals Board shall hear the review in accordance 
with: 
(A) Section 34A-1-205; and 
(B) Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(ii) A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the commission unless set aside by the 
court of appeals. 
(3) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the Appeals Board by filing the 
request with the Division of Adjudication: 
(a) as part of the motion for review; or 
(b) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for review, within 20 days of 
the date the motion for review is filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
(4) (a) On appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board may: 
(i) affirm the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(ii) modify the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(iii) return the case to an administrative law judge for further action as directed; or 
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of an administrative law judge. 
(b) The commissioner or Appeals Board may not conduct a trial de novo of the case. 
(c) The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its decision on: 
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or 
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental evidence requested by the commissioner or 
Appeals Board. 
(d) The commissioner or Appeals Board may permit the parties to: 
(i) file briefs or other papers; or 
(ii) conduct oral argument. 
(e) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the parties to any proceedings 
before it of its decision, including its findings and conclusions. 
(5) (a) A member of the Appeals Board may not participate in any case in which the member 
is an interested party. Each decision of a member of the Appeals Board shall represent the 
member's independent judgment. 
(b) If a member of the Appeals Board may not participate in a case because the member is an 
interested party, the two members of the Appeals Board that may hear the case shall assign an 
individual to participate as a member of the board in that case if the individual: 
(l) is not a interested party in the case; and 
(ii) was not previously assigned to preside over any proceeding or take any administrative 
action related to the case. 
(6) If an order is appealed to the court of appeals after the party appealing the order has 
exhausted all administrative appeals, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to: 
(a) review, reverse, remand, or annul any order of the commissioner or Appeals Board; or 
(b) suspend or delay the operation or execution of the order of the commissioner or Appeals 
Board being appealed. 
34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the dependents of 
each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death, 
and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of 
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital 
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the 
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
34A-2-410. Temporary disability - Amount of payments - State average weekly wage 
defined. 
(1) (a) In case of temporary disability, so long as the disability is total, the employee shall 
receive 66 2/3% of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury but: 
(i) not more than a maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week; and 
(ii) not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent children, not 
to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to 
exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
(b) In no case shall the compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date 
of the injury. 
(2) In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a 
fixed state of recovery, and when no light duty employment is available to the employee from 
the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(3) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, shall be determined by the commission as follows: 
(a) On or before June 1 of each year, the total wages reported on contribution reports to the 
Division of Workforce Information and Payment Services for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of insured workers determined by dividing 
the total insured workers reported for the preceding year by 12. 
(b) The average annual wage obtained under Subsection (3)(a) shall be divided by 52. 
(c) The average weekly wage determined under Subsection (3)(b) is rounded to the nearest 
dollar. 
(4) The state average weekly wage determined under Subsection (3) shall be used as the 
basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for: 
(a) injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease that occurred during the 
twelve-month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination; and 
(b) any death resulting from the injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease. 
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* 
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* AND ORDER 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC.; 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
* 
Respondents. * 
HEARING: February 26, 1998 at 2:00 P.M. 
BEFORE: Benjamin A. Sims, Law Judge 
APPEARING: Aaron Prisbrey, attorney-at-law, represented the petitioner. 
Theodore Kanell, attorney-at-law, represented the respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Glenda C. Chambers is the petitioner. At the time of the alleged injury on January 185 
1997, she was 31 years old, and had three dependent children under the age of 18. She was w of ^ 
two jobs, one for Red Cliffs Regional, Inc.(Cliffs), and one for Washington County ARC (ARC). She 
was not sure what the initials ARC stood for. She is asking for medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total disability compensation (TTC), temporary partial disability 
compensation (TPC), travel expenses, and interest based upon her claimed injuries to her back, knee 
and neck. 
2. At the time of the injury, she claims she was earning $6.15 per hour and was working 
46.75 hours per week for Cliffs, and was working 18-20 hours at $6.25 per hour for ARC. She was 
working as a coach for Cliffs. She described her job as assisting severely mentally and physically 
disabled people at Cliffs. At ARC, she did similar duties, but on more of an out-patient basis. 
I 3. On January 18, 1997, she says she was helping Grace at Cliffs. Grace is an older woman 
with no mobility. She cannot walk and was not known at that time to talk. The petitioner thought 
that Grace weighed about 200 pounds and was about 5 feet 6 inches tall. The petitioner says she 
attempted to get Grace up. She got Grace out of bed, and put her into a wheelchair. She says Grace 
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fell forward out of the wheelchair onto the petitioner. The petitioner says she attempted to get Grace 
back up, and Grace uttered the words, "You better." Petitioner did not know what the words "you 
better" meant. She had been told that Grace could or would not talk. This accident was unwitnessed. 
4. The petitioner alleges the following: She felt a shock through her left leg. Her back was 
numb. She took Grace to the lunch room, and finished her duties. She says she did not report the 
incident at that time because she was afraid to do so. However, she also claimed at the hearing that 
she told Val who was a duty nurse and Irene Wall another employee that she had been injured. Val 
denied that he had been told by the petitioner of her injury, and Irene Wall did not testify. The 
petitioner says she went to the Dixie Regional emergency room (emergency room) that night after 
she got off work because her back hurt. The emergency room provider noted the following: 
A 30-year-old female who was lifting a patient at Red Cliffs where she 
works. She hurt her back. She has pain in her back that radiates up to 
the top and down her legs. It is like a "burning ache," she states. The 
patient is usually healthy. Has never hurt her back before. No regular 
medical problems. She is allergic to codeine and takes no regular 
medications. She does not complain of any true paresthesias but has 
just a burning type of feeling down her legs that she can feel in both 
heels. No particular areas of numbness. No weakness in her legs. She 
has no loss of bladder or bowel control. 
* * * 
Weight 240 lbs.... She has pain in the lumbosacral area but can feel it 
all the way up to her thoracic spine region and down into her buttocks. 
When she sits up for me, she sits up easily. Legs have normal strength 
and tone. Reflexes symmetric. No Babinski. Sensation intact to touch, 
pressure and vibration. X-ray of back does not reveal any acute osseous 
abnormality. 
ASSESSMENT: Lifting injury with back strain and muscle spasm. 
PLAN: The patient was referred for physical therapy on Monday. She 
will be placed on an anti-inflammatory, Relafen, and a muscle relaxant 
as well as cool compresses. If she is not feeling better, we will have to 
reexamine her. 
MR 96- (Emphasis in original). It is noted the history given to the providers at the emergency room 
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[was based upon the petitioner's statements. 
5. The radiology report done on January 18, 1997 showed "mild to moderate degenerative 
disc narrowing and facet sclerosis at the lumbosacral junction. Facet disease is felt responsible for 
minimal ventral subluxation of L5 on S1. No pars defect or other acute bony process seen." MR 98. 
6. Another x-ray was taken of the lumbar spine on January 22, 1997 due to continued pain. 
No abnormalities were observed. MR 101. She was released to return to modified duty on January 
20, 1997 by Dr. David Jensevar. She claims that she called Cliffs and told someone that she could 
return to work, but no one called her back. She then later contradicted this statement by claiming she 
did not know that she could return to work because the doctor never told her that she could. 
However, she continued to work at ARC where she performed roughly similar duties. 
7. On January 31,1997, she saw Dr. Root for pain in her low back, mid back, neck, and legs 
including numbness in her knees and ankles. She reported she was injured at work when lifting, and 
had not had these problems in the past. MR 71. Dr. Root reported she had a past history of knee 
problems, and had seen Dr. Moore on January 30, 1997 for knee problems. Dr. Root felt she had 
lumbosacral as well as cervical and upper thoracic strain/sprain injury with superimposed degenerative 
disc/spine disease in the lumbar spine. Her work was limited to modified light duty for one week. 
MR 74. 
8. On February 7, 1997, Dr. Root reported there were no significant abnormalities in her 
spme x-rays, and that she did not come to physical therapy during the preceding week because she 
did not feel well. She was instructed by Dr. Root that if she did not comply with his instructions she 
would be considered to be noncompliant which would likely affect her workers' compensation 
benefits. She claimed she had no money to pay for therapy and that is why she did not go. However, 
the evidence shows she possessed a Medicaid card and Medicaid was paying her medical bills. Dr. 
Root kept her on light duty for another week. MR 76. 
9. Dr. Root saw her again on March 25, 1997. She reported to him she had hurt her back 
"this weekend lifting a patient." This could be considered to be an intervening accident. She testified 
this incident occurred at ARC. Dr. Root did not say whether she was retained on light duty. MR 78. 
She did not see Dr. Root after this date. 
10. She was scheduled for rehabilitation sessions on February 21,1997, March 4, 1997, and 
March 14, 1997. She did not appear for therapy on March 4, 1997. She did not come to therapy 
subsequent to March 25, 1997. Her physical therapy plan included treatment for three weeks 
beginning on February 27,1997 for 2-3 sessions per week. MR 62. She explained her reason for not 
attending as lack of funds. As discussed earlier in these findings, she had a Medicaid card which 
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would have entitled her to certain medical services presumably including this treatment. MR 64. Her 
statement that she could not get treatment due to lack of funds is suspect. On April 9, 1997, the 
therapist Roger Harward reported that no further care was planned, and that the petitioner had been 
reinjured while working for ARC. MR 67. At the time that her therapy was terminated, she was 
"working about full time for ARC." Exhibit R-2. She stated at the hearing on a number of occasions 
that the doctors and therapists did not tell her things which these professionals report in their medical 
records they did tell her. 
11. She saw Dr. Gunn, D.C. on August 20, 25, 28, 1997. He performed ultrasound and 
manipulation on her on these dates for "acute traumatic lumbar and cervical sprains with paravertebral 
splinting, bilateral sciatic neuritis, and suboccipital frontal cephalalgia." MR 1. 
12. There was testimony from Nancy Stewart and Kelly Cottam who both work at ARC. 
They remembered the petitioner complained of back pain. Nancy Stewart testified the petitioner hurt 
herself pushing a wheelchair for ARC, but Nancy Stewart also testified the petitioner said she had 
hurt herself elsewhere. Kelly Cottam testified the petitioner indicated she could not push the 
wheelchair at ARC because of her back problems. 
13. Val Penman is a registered nurse at Cliffs. He does not remember ever talking to the 
petitioner about a work injury even though the petitioner claims that she did. He is sure that if she 
had notified him, he would have filed out an incident report since that is standard procedure. 
14. The petitioner requested that the issue of permanent partial impairment be reserved. 
15. Prior to her injury at Cliffs, she claims no problems with her neck, head, and back. She 
did have problems with her knees previous to the January 18, 1997 alleged incident, but now claims 
that she cannot crawl, although she could previously. 
16. She testified that she worked 39 hours at Cliffs during the 16 day period January 1-15, 
1997. On January 18, 1997, she went to lunch at 10:47 A.M. and stopped work at 2:57 P.M. She 
never came back to any type of work at Cliffs after January 18, 1997. With regard to her work at 
ARC, she did not work at ARC on Saturday, January 18, 1997, but she worked the following hours 
for ARC on the dates indicated: 
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19 January 1997 6 hours 
20 9 
21 5 
22 7 hours 
23 0 
24 4 
25 8 
The hours show that she was working full time for ARC after her injury at Cliffs. 
17. She was terminated on February 10, 1997 because she had not called or shown up for 
work over an extended period of time. 
18. The testimony of the petitioner is inconsistent and she contradicted herself on material 
and relevant bits of information essential to a resolution of this case. Her testimony when compared 
to the testimony of others, and when viewed in connection with medical documents is also deficient. 
The petitioner testified a patient fell on her in an unwitnessed accident on January 18, 1997. 
However, the totality of the evidence is insufficient to show the circumstances which she alleges since 
her testimony is less than credible, and every bit of evidence in this case which can be mustered to 
show that she was injured must rely on her statement that she in fact was injured. There is no 
independent evidence not relying on her statement to show that the incident did occur. If she had 
been more credible in other instances in this case, the evidence might have been sufficient to a 
preponderance to confirm her claim. 
19. Assuming that her claim of injury is sufficient to meet the legal causation requirement, 
the evidence likewise fails to show she notified her employer she was returned to modified duty. The 
evidence further shows she was able to continue working a full time job for ARC, and did so. She 
cannot pick and choose which employer to work for especially if she wants her employer to pay her 
workers' compensation benefits. However, in this case, she obviously did. She continued to work 
for ARC. She claims she made a phone call to Cliffs to tell them she could return to work, but she 
then alleges her doctor never told her she could return to work. She also cannot remember who she 
talked to at Cliffs. These are just some of the inconsistencies which made her testimony doubtful. 
20. Unfortunately, the preponderance of the evidence does not show the petitioner was 
injured in the manner alleged, and her claim must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The evidence is insufficient to a preponderance to show that the petitioner Glenda Chambers 
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was injured in a accident arising out of and in the course of employment for Red Cliffs Regional, Inc. 
on January 18, 1997 as required by the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of Glenda Chambers for workers' compensation 
benefits based upon an injury to her back, knee and neck, alleged to have arisen out of and in the 
course of employment for Red Cliffs Regional, Inc. on January 18, 1997 is dismissed with prejudice 
for failure to show legal causation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be received 
in the offices of the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the Division of Adjudication within 
thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a 
Motion for Review is received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date 
hereof, any response by the opposing party shall be filed within 15 days of the date of receipt of the 
Motion for Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12. 
A Motion for Review will be decided by the Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of 
the parties requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board in accordance with 
U.C.A. Section 34A-1-303 within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, or in the case of a party 
responding to the Motion for Review, the request must be made within twenty (20) days of the date 
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication. 
Dated this J j 7 day of May 1998. 
H3£pj3min A. Sims 
j£aw Jupge 
a3: chambers, ord.wpd L ^ ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I did mail by U.S. prepaid 
postage the Order in the case of Glenda Chambers v. Red Cliffs 
Regional, Inc., Case No. 97462 to the following on May 27, 1998: 
Glenda Chambers 
18057 Jonathan Street 
Adelanto CA 92301 
Theodore Kanell, Atty 
PO Box 2970 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970 
Aaron J. Prisbrey, Atty 
135 North 900 East, Ste 
St. George UT 84770 
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Aaron J. Prisbrey #6968 
Eric S.Lind #7920 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
135 North 900 East, Suite #4 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone 801/673-1661 
GLENDA CHAMBERS 
Petitioner, 
v. 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC. & 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY , 
Respondents. 
REQUEST FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 97462 
Petitioner, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-1, et. seg., the Rules and 
Regulations of the Industrial Commission of Utah, inter alia, respectfully files its Request for 
Review of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated May 27, 1998, in the above-
entitled case. 
I. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 
Petitioner argues on appeal that the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact were 
not adequate and are not "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court," as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner alleges that she was injured on January 18, 1997 at Red Cliffs Regional while 
assisting a patient into her wheelchair. 
2. A hearing was held on this matter on February 26, 1998 at 2:00 p.m. 
3. Evidence was presented concerning the circumstances of the alleged accident. 
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4. At the time of the accident, Petitioner allegedly felt a shock through her leg and her 
back was numb. 
5. Petitioner went to the DRMC emergency room at night when she got off work. The 
emergency room report indicates that she hurt her back while lifting a patient at work. 
6. In a report by Dr. Root dated January 31,1997, Dr. Root stated "[sjhe reported she was 
injured at work when lifting . . . . " (Findings at paragraph 7). 
7. At the time of injury Petitioner was working another job at Washington County ARC. 
Petitioner continued working with ARC after her injury at Red Cliffs Regional. 
8. Kelly Cottam and Nancy Stewart, who worked with Petitioner at ARC, testified that 
they were aware that Petitioner had injured her back at another job. Moreover, these 
witnesses testified that Petitioner's back condition limited her ability to perform certain 
duties at ARC. 
III. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, provides that a presiding officer must sign an 
order including "a statement of the officer's findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence 
. . . or on facts officially noted." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(l)(a) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the presiding officer must give "a statement of the reasons for [his/her] decision." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10(l)(c) (emphasis added). 
In Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, the Supreme Court clearly 
articulated the proper standard regarding findings of fact: 
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings of 
fact is essential to a proper determination by an administrative 
agency. To that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or 
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached. . . . Without 
such findings, this Court cannot . . . [protect] the parties and the 
public from arbitrary and capricious administrative action. 
720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986)(cited in 821 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Additionally, findings of fact are only adequate when they are supported by "substantial 
evidence" viewed by the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). In applying 
2 
002 
the substantial evidence test, a court must review the whole record including, "not only the 
evidence supporting the board's factual findings, but also the evidence tnat tairly detracts 
from the weight of the board's evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 
63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). (Emphasis added). 
In this situation, the Court has failed to make any findings relative.to evidence 
favorable to Petitioner. Moreover, the court's findings misconstrue evidence presented at 
hearing. In its findings, the court notes that Petitioner continued working for ARC after her 
injury at Red Cliffs. The court states that "[a]t ARC, [petitioner] did similar duties" and that 
"[Petitioner] continued to work at ARC where she performed roughly similar duties." 
(Findings at paragraph 2 & 6). However, at hearing Kelly Cottam and Nancy Stewart testified 
that Petitioner was seriously restricted in her ability to perform certain tasks at ARC. In 
particular, Nancy Stewart testified that she had to virtually take over the care of one of 
Petitioner's patients, because Petitioner's back condition made it impracticable for Petitioner to 
afford the necessary care. 
The ALJ states that "petitioner is inconsistent and she contradicted herself on material 
and relevant bits of information" and that "[h]er testimony when compared to the testimony of 
others, and when viewed in connection with medical documents is also deficient." (Findings at 
paragraph 18). However, the ALJ does not detail relevant inconsistencies that show that her 
claim of injury is dubious. If there are any inconsistencies.they regard Petitioner's memory of 
lengthy and detailed medical records, and her lack of understanding regarding the use of 
medicaid and her understanding of her financial ability to get medical treatment-but not as to 
whether the accident happened. In fact, the record substantiates that the accident did happen. 
Petitioner's claim of how the accident occurred remained consistent through a number of 
sources. 
Petitioner claimed that the accident happened while assisting a patient into a wheelchair 
at Red Cliffs Regional. The emergency room report indicated that Petitioner was "a 30-year-old 
female who was lifting a patient at Red Cliffs where she works. She hurt her back." (Findings at 
paragraph 4). In a report by Dr. Root dated January 31, 1997, Dr. Root stated "[s]he reported she 
was injured at work when lifting " (Findings at paragraph 7). Kelly Cottam and Nancy 
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Stewart (coemployees at ARC) indicated that they were aware that petitioner had injured her 
back at her other employment, and that that injury caused her cortinuirg pain ana prevented her 
from performing certain activities. All of the above corroborates the fact that Petitioner was 
injured while lifting a patient at Red Cliffs. On the other hand, the on-y evidence to suggest that 
Petitioner was not injured as she claims, is the statement of Val Penman .that he does not 
remember ever talking to Petitioner about an injury. 
The ALPs decision that Petitioner was not injured while working at Red Cliffs Regional 
is not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record, and the ALJ did not 
sufficiently detail or explain away evidence that corroborated that the accident did in fact occur 
as alleged. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests that the decision of the ALJ be reversed on the issue 
of legal causation, and that the Board find that Petitioner was injured in an accident at Red Cliffs 
Regional on January 18, 1997 while assisting a patient into a wheelchair. 
00216 
M DATED thistfiJday of June 1998 
Aaron J. Prisbrey/Eric S. Lind 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I did mail by U.S. prepaid postage a copy of this Motion For 
Review to the following on this <?< / June, 1998. 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Post Office Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Glenda Chambers 
18057 Jonathan Street 
Adelanto, CA 92301 
Theodore Kanell 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
Aaron J. Prisbrey/Eric S. Lind 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, * 
* 
Applicant, * ORDER OF REMAND 
* 
v. * 
* 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC. and * 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * Case No. 97-0462 
Defendants. * 
Glenda Chambers asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the 
Administrative Law Judge's denial of her claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Was Ms. Chambers involved in an accident while working for Red Cliffs Regional, Inc. 
("Red Cliffs" hereafter) on January 18, 1997? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On the date of Ms. Chambers' alleged accident, she was working as a nurse's assistant for 
two different employers, Red Cliffs and Washington County ARC ("ARC" hereafter). Ms. 
Chambers has testified that the accident occurred while she attempted to lift a patient into a wheel 
chair at Red Cliffs. The patient, who cannot speak and has no control over her muscles, fell forward 
from the wheel chair. As Ms. Chambers tried to catch the patient, she fell backward with the patient 
on top of her. Ms. Chambers felt pain in her back, but was able to return the patient to her wheel 
chair. 
Ms. Chambers completed her shift without reporting the foregoing incident to Red Cliffs 
management. She did not report the incident because she had nearly been fired for poor attendance 
a few days earlier and, consequently, was afraid to report the accident with her patient. She alleges 
that because her back pain grew worse over the next few hours, she sought treatment that evening 
at a hospital emergency room. She told the emergency room staff she had hurt her back at work in 
a lifting accident. Emergency room staff provided treatment and submitted the "Physician's First 
Report Of Work Injury or Occupational Disease" to the Labor Commission. 
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Ms. Chambers contends that she subsequently called Red Cliffs and reported her accident 
to someone she believed was Val Penman, R.N. Mr. Penman does not recall any conversation with 
Ms. Chambers. A few days later, on January 22, 1997, she formally reported her accident to Red 
Cliffs. That same day, Red Cliffs filed the "Employer's First Report of Injury" with the Labor 
Commission. 
As previously noted, Ms. Chambers was working at both Red Cliffs and ARC at the time of 
her accident. Her co-workers at ARC, Nancy Stewart and Kelly Cottam, recall that Ms. Chambers 
began suffering from back pain at about the time of the alleged accident and that she said she had 
injured her back while working at Red Cliffs. 
In addition to the medical treatment Ms. Chambers received at the emergency room on the 
evening of the accident, she sought treatment from other physicians and chiropractors. In each case, 
she advised them that she had injured her back in a lifting accident at work. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Ms. Chambers' right to workers' compensation benefits is based on her claim that she was 
injured in an accident on January 18, 1997 while working for Red Cliffs. If the accident did not 
occur, then Ms. Chambers' claim for benefits must fail. The Appeals Board has, therefore, carefully 
considered the evidence on this critical threshold issue. 
Ms. Chambers has testified under oath that the accident in question did, in fact, occur. 
Obviously, Ms. Chambers has an interest in the outcome of this case, but her testimony cannot be 
entirely discounted on that basis alone. Her description of the incident is plausible and has remained 
consistent since the event occurred. The fact that the event was essentially unwitnessed is not 
unusual, since Ms. Chambers' work duties placed her in isolated situations. The record is clear that 
Ms. Chambers sought medical attention the same evening as the accident and attributed her injuries 
to the accident at Red Cliffs. She also told other medical providers and co-workers that she had been 
injured in an accident at Red Cliffs. The Appeals Board notes that all these statements are consistent 
and were made long before Ms. Chambers stopped working or claimed workers' compensation 
benefits. 
While the foregoing facts support Ms. Chambers' version of events, her failure to 
immediately report the accident to Red Cliffs' staff tends to undermine her credibility. Nevertheless, 
the Appeals Board concludes that the preponderance of evidence establishes that on January 18, 
1997, Ms. Chambers was involved in the accident while working at Red Cliffs. 
Because the Appeals Board finds that Ms. Chambers was injured in a work related accident, 
it is necessary to remand this case to the ALJ for further proceedings to resolve issues of legal and 
medical causation and the benefits due Ms. Chambers, if any. 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board grants Ms. Chambers' motion for review and remands this matter to the 
ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this M- day oCAttgtfst, 1998. 
^ / • i 
olleen S. Colton, Chair 
/ 
Stephen/ Bee/ley^>^ 
L. Zane Gill 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILTNG 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Of Remand in the matter of Glenda Chambers, 
Case No. 97-0462, was mailed first class postage prepaid this 1st day of September, 1998, to the 
following: 
GLENDA CHAMBERS 
18057 JONATHAN STREET 
ADELANTOCA 92301 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC. 
1745 EAST 280 NORTH 
ST. GEORGE UT 84770 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY 
PO BOX 18730 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118-0730 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
4 TRIAD CENTER #500 
PO BOX 2970 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2970 
AARON J. PRISBEY 
135 NORTH 900 EAST #4 
ST. GEORGE UT 84770 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
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THEODORE E. KANELL (17 68) 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, 
Applicant, 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC., and * 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
• 
Defendants. * 
The defendants, pursuant to the Rules of the Labor Commission, 
and § 63-466-13 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), respectfully 
request that the Appeals Board reconsider its decision setting 
aside the order of the Honorable Benjamin Sims. It appears from 
the order from the Appeals Board, that they have determined that 
they are in a better position to make determinations with respect 
to credibility of witnesses than the actual Judge who witnessed and 
observed the demeanor of the witness at the time of the hearing. 
This motion for reconsideration is brought to preserve the 
integrity and the significance of the hearing process. It is 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 97462 
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further based upon the well settled rule of law which allows only 
the trier of fact or the hearer of evidence to ascertain 
credibility of witnesses. Furthermore, th£ 'Constitution of the 
United States and the State of Utah allows 4II defendants to come 
face to face through actual confrontation of pll witnesses that are 
called to testify against them. The constitutional basis for the 
face to face confrontation requirement is tq allow each party the 
opportunity to cross-examine and to allow the trier of fact to 
determine what weight to give each piece of evidence and whether or 
not the evidence submitted is believable. Or|ily the trier of fact, 
which is the Administrative Law Judge in the Labor Commission, has 
the ability to observe and see the demeanor (of each witness. 
The case before the Administrative Law (Judge showed that the 
incident complained of by the applicant was an unwitnessed, 
unverified, and not properly reported incident. The applicant, 
when finally getting around to reporting the incident, gave three 
different stories of how it happened. She claimed different time 
frames and different activities caused th|e alleged incident. 
Immediately after the incident she claimed t|o be unable to work, 
and on the stand, under oath, she told the Judge that she was 
seeking payments for temporary total disability. It was only on 
cross-examination wherein she was confronted with her actual time 
records from her other job, that she admitted that she went to work 
immediately full time with her other employer without missing any 
actual time off work. The defendant employer presented evidence 
that the applicant made no report of the incident. The defendants 
could have presented more evidence at the time showing the 
contradictory statements of the applicant, but at the hearing it 
was determined that it was unnecessary. Based upon the applicant's 
demeanor, it was clear that credibility was lacking. 
In this particular case, only the Administrative Law Judge 
could observe the countenance and candor of the applicant as she 
attempted to testify. What the Administrative Law Judge observed 
cannot be reviewed or observed by reviewing a written record. The 
applicant's voice tone, her facial expression, her body language, 
her skin tones, her fidgety movements, the confidence in her 
answers, the lack of eye contact, all were determined by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Apparently, in this case, because of 
these things, and the contradictory nature of her testimony, the 
Administrative Law Judge deemed that Ms. Chambers was not a 
credible witness. These are all items that cannot be reviewed by 
the Appeals Board, and historically are items that have not been 
the subject of appeal. Only the Administrative Law Judge, who 
takes the actual evidence and reviews the testimony, is in a 
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position to feel what is being presented, to see what is being 
presented, and to sense what is being presented. Our Supreme Court 
has stated in the case of Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997): 
"We give deference to the initial decision maker on 
questions of fact because it stands 
position from which to evaluate and we 
assess the credibility and accuracy 
recollections." See State v. Pena, Rft9 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994) . 
in a superior 
|igh evidence and 
of witnesses' 
The Appeals Board, by reversing the Administrative Law Judge, 
is attempting to do away with the constitutibnal hearing process, 
which includes the right to confront witnesses. The ruling of the 
Appeals Board in this particular case in eflf^ ct is reducing the 
role of the Administrative Law Judge to nothing more than a note 
taker, rather than a trier of fact. The Appeals Board cannot take 
evidence and make credibility determinations, |§ 34A-1-303 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
It is well settled in Utah that the triet of fact is the only 
person who can consider the credibility of the witnesses. It is 
never to be overturned unless there is no evjidence whatsoever to 
support the Judge's position. In this easel, the Appeals Board 
thinks that there was sufficient evidence to jsupport finding that 
there was an accident. The defendants assept that the Appeals 
Board has applied the wrong standard. The standard is not whether 
or not there is any evidence to support the position not found by 
the Judge, but whether or not there is evidence to support the 
position found by the Judge. In this particular case, the Appeals 
Board has relied upon the evidence of the medical records and some 
witnesses in verifying that the accident happened. A quick review 
of the evidence clearly shows that the evidence was all solely 
derived from statements made by the applicant. Therefore, if the 
applicant's credibility is lacking, then it stands to reason that 
those statements that she made to third parties is also lacking. 
In short, there is no independent evidence to support the 
applicant's claim. In fact, the only evidence that supports her 
claim is evidence which she created herself, by her own statements. 
As mentioned before, even this evidence is contradictory. Her 
statements as to how the accident happened and as to the time of 
day that it happened are all contradictory. Furthermore, the 
witnesses who were friends of the applicant claimed that the sole 
substance of their testimony comes directly from the applicant. It 
was interesting to note that on cross-examination none of the 
witnesses could identify a time or a place or who else might have 
been present when the alleged statements were made. It is also 
interesting to note that the applicant suffered another accident at 
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her other job. No demarcation was made lj>y these witnesses to 
whether these statements were made before o:|: after that accident. 
In conclusion, the action by the Appeals Board in this case 
has reduced the function of the Administrative Law Judge to a 
trivial, meaningless exercise of taking note|s of the evidence. To 
take away from the Administrative Law JUdge the ability to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses takes away from the 
process the whole purpose and deprives the defendant the 
constitutional right to adequate cross-exami|nation. Furthermore, 
the action of the Appeals Board in determ|ining that there was 
other evidence to support the applicant's stiatement is misleading 
and illogical. Specifically, the only otheir evidence to support 
the applicant's claim were the applicant's statements to other 
persons. 
The defendants submit this motion for redonsideration in order 
to preserve the integrity and significance of the hearing process. 
The defendants submit this motion also to uphqld the legitimacy and 
honor of the Administrative Law Judges. 1]hey are the initial 
decision maker and should be given deference^ By law, only they 
have the ability to make credibility determinations. The 
defendants respectfully submit that the Appeals Board is not 
equipped nor is it in a position tcj make credibility 
determinations. Furthermore, the Appeals board does not have 
authority to overturn Administrative Law Judges determinations with 
respect to credibility and the logic utilized in their Order of 
Remand is flawed as the evidence relied upon came solely from the 
applicant's mouth. If the applicant is deemed not credible, then 
neither is the evidence from other sources reliable. 
The Appeals Board is not the Labor Commission and as such must 
only perform reviews as allowed by statute. They cannot take 
evidence and therefore "It is not for this Court to determine the 
weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses," Burrell 
v. Industrial Commission, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987), but must 
review the evidence to see if the evidence supports the findings of 
the Administrative Law Judge. Accordingly, the defendants request 
the Order of the Appeals Board to be set aside and the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /jT^ day of J^T^f 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
Attorney for Defendants 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615 
Case No. 97462 
GLENDA C. CHAMBERS, * 
* 
Petitioner, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
* CONCLUSION OF LAW 
v. * AND ORDER ON REMAND 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC.; * 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
* 
Respondents. * 
INTRODUCTION: 
This case was remanded by the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission on September 
1, 1998. The Appeals Board remanded the case to the Law Judge to "resolve issues of legal and 
medical causation." Since the Appeals Board found Glenda Chambers (Chambers) to be a credible 
witness, it now remains only to determine the extent of her work related injuries and the benefits tc 
which she is entitled. 
She is asking for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) from January 19,1997 to 
August 28,1997 during the period she claims she was not able to work at the Red Cliffs Regional 
(Red Cliffs). The evidence shows she worked for ARC through August 24,1997 at which time she 
terminated her employment with ARC. At the time of her injury while working for Red Cliffs, the 
time sheets show for the seven days including the date of injury, she worked the following hours at 
Red Cliffs: 
12 January 1996 8.5 hours 
13 8.0 
14 6.25 
15 0 
16 7.0 
17 8.25 
18 8.75 
The time sheets submitted by Red Cliffs show she worked 46.75 hours for the seven day period 
immediately preceding her injury. It is appropriate to include the day of her injury since she worked 
a full day on this date. She was earning $6.15 per hour for a total of $308.27 while working for Red 
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Cliffs. She was working initially for 16.50 hours during the Janualry 12-18,1996 period noted above 
at ARC for $6.25 per week for a total of $103.13 per week. This drives her a weekly total of $411.40 
which equates to a workers' compensation TTC rate of $274 to [which shall be added $15 for her 
three underage dependents for a weekly total of $289. 
After her injury at Red Cliffs, she increased her hours at IARC. This shows she was able to 
work, at least modified duty. Based on the fact she was working, she is not entitled to TTC, but is 
instead entitled to TPC. The evidence shows she missed no days of work at ARC. During the period 
of TPC (January 19,1996 through August 28,1996), she worked 961.5 hours and earned $6,009.38 
at ARC. The period of weeks covered is 31.714. This gives hen average weekly earnings at ARC 
of $189.49. This entitles her to a TPC rate of $148 per week tolwhich shall be added $15 for her 
dependents for a total of $163. 
Chambers has preexisting degenerative disc/spine disealse in the lumbar spine. She has 
preexisting problems in both knees. On October 13,1995, the medical records note she was "very 
overweight," at approximately 240 pounds, and complaints of pain were associated with her knees. 
At the emergency room on January 18,1997, she reported she hadmain in the lumbosacral areas, and 
could feel it all the way up to her thoracic spine region and down into her buttocks. X-rays were 
taken of her knees, but there was no objective evidence of any problem with them. She was 
determined by the emergency room physician to have a lifting injury with back strain and muscle 
spasm. The preponderance of the evidence shows her complaints centered around her lumbar region 
and cervical region. 
She incurred an injury to her back during the weekend wljiile lifting a patient while working 
for ARC. MR 67 and 78. Dr. Root made the following statement on March 25,1997: 
Patient ... evidently strained herself this weekeiid lifting a patient. Her physical 
therapist will assess for further strain injury arid will also consider a modified 
functional capacity evaluation.... 
On April 9,1997, the physical therapist Roger Harward 
back while working for ARC, but noted she "refused further treatment 
was terminated by the physical therapist. He noted no further 
also noted he she did not comply with his regimen of therapy, 
was not cooperative with treatment after April 9,1997, and she wc|uld not be 
that date, the Appeals Board's finding of credibility on the part 
result since she testified she did cooperate, and the reason she 
because she had no money. It is also noted that IHC is a nonprofit 
patients who do not have the funds can voluntarily apply for payment 
had no qualms about seeking charitable relief since she possessed 
her to have the State pay for her medical care, in certain instances 
Iso reported she had reinjured her 
There is no indication she 
was planned. MR 67. Dr. Root 
Although it could be found that she 
entitled to TPC beyond 
o|f the petitioner dictates a contrary 
not get additional treatment was 
charitable institution to which 
relief. Chambers apparently 
a medicaid card which entitled 
There was also no notation on 
•care 
difl 
00275 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, ORDER ON REMAND 
any of the medical records that she was being cut off for any reason other than her lack of 
compliance or her indication she did not desire further medical treatment. 
The petitioner did not seek further treatment according to Dr. Root after March 25,1996 even 
though Dr. Root indicated that he desired her to see a physical therapist. (The physical therapist 
noted she was last treated on April 9,1997). She was working for ARC at that time, and not the 
respondents. The weekend period would have been on or about 22-23 March 1997. The March 22-
23, 1997 back reinjury while she was working at ARC would presumably cut off liability for her 
back injury on the part of Red Cliffs, since Chambers would be entitled to medical treatment from 
ARC workers' compensation benefits. However, the medical evidence is lacking as to the extent 
of her injury at ARC, and it is not clear how her injury of January 18,1996 was affected by the event 
at ARC. Therefore, liability will continue for Red Cliffs. 
No evidence has been presented as to a permanent partial impairment rating related to the 
Red Cliffs' incident of January 18,1997. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. TPC is available when the petitioner can work, because of her industrial injury, only a 
portion of the hours she was working at the time of her industrial injury. U.C.A. Section 35-1-65.1. 
2. Chambers suffered lumbosacral as well as cervical and upper thoracic stain/sprain 
including temporary knee problems as a result of a fall injury incurred on January 18,1997 which 
arose out of and in the course of her employment for Red Cliffs. U.C.A. Section 35-1-45. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Red Cliffs Regional and/or Business Insurance Company 
pay the medical and travel expenses of Glenda Chambers for her lumbar and cervical region, neck, 
and knees incurred on January 18,1997 through August 25,1997 according to the RVS of the Utah 
Labor Commission with interest of eight percent per annum to be paid to the medical providers from 
the date when the medical providers first billed for the medical treatment. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Red Cliffs Regional and/or Business Insurance Company 
pay temporary partial disability compensation to Glenda Chamber s for the period January 19,1997 
through August 25,1997 at a rate of $163 per week for 31.714 weeks for a total of $5,169.38. This 
amount is accrued and will be paid in a lump sum with eight percent interest per annum from the 
date when the periodic payment was first due. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Red Cliffs Regional and/or Business Insurance Company 
pay Aaron Prisbrey, attorney for Glenda Chambers, an attorney's fee of $1,033.88 plus 20 percent 
3 • ' 
0027 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, ORDER ON REMAND 
of the interest which is paid to Ms. Chambers. The amount paid] 
from the amount to be paid to Ms. Chambers, and shall be sent 
to Mr. Prisbrey shall be deducted 
cjlirectly to Mr. Prisbrey. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review) 
in the offices of the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) 
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless receive]! 
within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order shall be 
appeal. If a Motion for Review is received by the Division of Ac|jud: 
of the date hereof, any response by the opposing party shall be 
receipt of the Motion for Review by the Division of Adjudication J 
63-46b-12. A Motion for Review will be decided by the Commissioner 
unless any of the parties requests that the Motion for Review be 
accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-303 within thirty (30) 
of a party responding to the Motion for Review, the request mus 
of the date the Motion for Review was filed with the Division 
i days 
of the foregoing shall be received 
days of the date hereof, specifying 
by the Division of Adjudication 
f|inal and not subject to review or 
ication within thirty (30) days 
ililed within 15 days of the date of 
|n accordance with U.C.A. Section 
of the Labor Commission 
[decided by the Appeals Board in 
of the date hereof, or in the case 
be made within twenty (20) days 
of Adjudication. 
Dated this n day of September 1998. 
a3 :chambers.ord.wpd 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I did mail by U.S. prepaid 
postage the Order in the case of Glenda Chambers v. Red Cliffs 
Regional, Inc., Case No. 97462 to the following on September ^ 7 , /9~/?_9 
T Q Q Q . ' I ' 1998 
Glenda Chambers 
18057 Jonathan Street 
Adelanto CA 92301 
Theodore Kanell, Atty 
PO Box 2970 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970 
Aaron J. Prisbrey, Atty 
135 North 900 East, Ste #4 
St. George UT 84770 '^^4l^c^A 
Kathy tfbuskeeper 
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THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, * 
* REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Applicant, * OR ALTERNATE MOTION FOR 
* REVIEW 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC., and * 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * Case No. 97462 
• 
Defendants. * 
The Defendant, Red Cliff Regional Inc. and its insurance 
carrier, Business Insurance Company, hereby respectfully requests 
that the Administrative Law Judge review his decision as to the 
facts, found as there is no support for any award of medical and 
compensation benefits after March 25, 1997 and clearly no 
compensation benefits after January 19, 1997. It is clear that the 
Administrative Law Judge feels compelled to award benefits as asked 
for by the Applicant in light of the unprecedented position taken 
by the Appeals Board in making a determination on credibility. In 
fact, the Defendants attach hereto and mark as Exhibit "A" their 
Motion for Reconsideration to the Appeals Board which was not ruled 
002S2 
upon because the Appeals Board felt chere wap no final order. The 
Defendants again reassert these positions as Ithough fully set forth 
herein. 
In making this request to the Administrative Law Judge, the 
Defendants note that even though the App|eals Board took the 
unprecedented position of finding credibility on behalf of the 
Applicant, even though they did not observe tjhe Applicant, did not 
experience the Applicant's testimony or lact thereof, and had no 
way of making a determination of credibility, that their 
credibility determination only went to one a|spect of the case; to 
wit, whether or not there was an accident Ion January 18, 1997. 
Even though it now appears that the Appeals Board, through 
clairvoyance, revelation or some extraordinary sixth sense has 
determined that her credibility plays no palrt in the rulings on 
these cases, the Appeals Board did not sa^ |r that the Applicant 
needed to be believed on all issues, only on[whether or not there 
was an accident on January 18, 1997. What thel Appeals Board failed 
to realize was that all of the Applicant's evidence was based upon 
her statements to other people. If in fabt she is found not 
credible then her statements to other people, [also are not credible 
and their reasoning and logic is flawed and| is not supported by 
common sense, fair play or the basic rules of (justice. In fact, it 
is incredible to these Defendants that the Apjbeal Board could take 
the position that they have taken in light of the role that the 
Administrative Law Judges are given by statute and procedure. In 
making this request, the Defendants further point out to the 
Administrative Law Judge that the Appeals Board found the 
following: 
"Because the Appeals Board finds that Ms. Chambers was injured 
in a work related accident, it is necessary to remand this 
case to the ALJ for further proceedings to resolve issues of 
legal and medical causation and the benefits due Ms. Chambers, 
if any." (See, Page 2.) 
These Defendants hereby respectfully request that the 
Administrative Law Judge retract his Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order on Remand as they are not supported by any' 
evidence and to further reiterate that legal causation is lacking 
in this case because of the Applicant's inability to be forthright 
in her testimony and medical causation is lacking because the 
Applicant was returned to light duty work immediately after the 
accident. As testified to by the Defendants, light duty work was 
available for the Applicant, but she failed to return to work with 
the Defendant. She begin working full time at ARC. This again 
supports the position of the medical doctors that she was able to 
work and not "temporarily totally disabled" as defined by the 
statute. The Defendants therefore respectfully request that the 
Administrative Law Judge amend the Order to include payment of 
-3- ' 
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medical expenses, but no-payment for temporary total disability as 
there is no medical evidence to support t^e same. The medical 
evidence is that the Applicant vus returned |:o light duty work and 
that she in fact did return to full dutyl work with her other 
employer. The evidence also showed that thei|:e was light duty work 
available for the Applicant at the Defendants' place of employ, 
which she refused to follow. 
Furthermore, the evidence shows that t|he Applicant was not 
even that injured and that it did not resjilt in any permanent 
impairment and furthermore that there would be no benefits to the 
Applicant after March 25, 1997, the last dateitnat she chose not to 
seek any further treatment. Furthermore, t|he evidence is clear 
that the Applicant was uncooperative and that the Applicant 
suffered from preexisting degenerative disc disease in the lumbar 
spine. She also had preexisting problems in fcoth knees. She also 
was overweight, which could have been the pause of all of her 
problems. 
In conclusion, the Defendants would simjply request that the 
Administrative Law Judge not get caught up in the games being 
played by the Appeals Board and seriously analyze the facts as 
given by the Applicant. The fact that thfe Appeals Board has 
determined that there may have been an accident on January 18th does 
not mean that the Applicant would be entitled to temporary total 
disability. In fact, there is no medical evidence to support 
temporary total disability payments. Furthermore, since the 
Applicant suffered from a serious preexisting condition as noted by 
the records of degenerative disc and spine disease, there is no 
real evidence that what the Applicant was doing on January 18th was 
anything out of the ordinary. In fact, what she was doing is 
nothing more than a person would do at home taking care of their 
own mother or father or children, or in assisting a neighbor or 
friend. Furthermore, there is no medical proof whatsoever to 
support a claim of compensation or medical award after March 25, 
1997. It would be a total shame to allow this matter to go back to 
the Appeals Board without well reasoned findings by the 
Administrative Law Judge. But 'then again, maybe that is what they 
want, to be the front line finders of fact dispatching with the 
need for Administrative Law Judges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this a ' day of J^^i , 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
Attorney for Defendants 
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THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
 t 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, * 
• MOTION FpR RECONSIDERATION 
Applicant, * 
* 
v. . * | 
* Case No.I 97462 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC., and * 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
• 
Defendants. * 
The defendants, pursuant to the Rules of [the Labor Commission, 
and § 63-466-13 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) , respectfully 
request that the Appeals Board reconsider Jits decision setting 
aside the order of the Honorable Benjamin Sims, It appears from 
the order from the Appeals Board, that they|have determined that 
they are in a better position to make determinations with respect 
to credibility of witnesses than the actual Jijdge who witnessed and 
observed the demeanor of the witness at the time of the hearing. 
This motion for reconsideration is broug|ht to . preserve the 
integrity and the significance of the hear|ing process. It is 
002S9 
further based upon the well settled rule of law which allows only 
the trier of fact or the hearer of evidence to ascertain 
credibility of witnesses. Furthermore, the Constitution of the 
United States and the State of Utah allows all defendants to come 
face to face through actual confrontation of all witnesses that are 
called to testify against them. The constitutional basis for the 
face to face confrontation requirement is to allow each party the 
opportunity to cross-examine and to allow the trier of fact to 
determine what weight to give each piece of evidence and whether or 
not the evidence submitted is believable. Only the trier of fact, 
which is the Administrative Law Judge in the Labor Commission, has 
the ability to observe and see the demeanor of each witness. 
The case before the Administrative Law Judge showed that the 
incident complained of by the applicant was an unwitnessed, 
unverified, and not properly reported incident. The applicant, 
when finally getting arouhd to reporting the incident, gave three 
different stories of how it happened. She claimed different time 
frames and different activities caused the alleged incident. 
Immediately after the incident she claimed to be unable to work, 
and on the stand, under oath, she told the Judge that she was 
seeking payments for temporary total disability. It was only on 
cross-examination wherein she was confronted with her actual time 
-2-
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records from her other job, that she admitteo|that she went to work 
immediately full time with her other employe!: without missing any 
actual time off work. The defendant employer presented evidence 
that the applicant made no report of the incident. The defendants 
could have presented more evidence at tfc[e time showing the 
contradictory statements of the applicant, hlut at the hearing it 
was determined that it was unnecessary. Based| upon the applicant's 
demeanor, it was clear that credibility was packing. 
In this particular case, only the Administrative Law Judge 
could observe the countenance and candor of |the applicant as she 
attempted to testify. What the Administrative Law Judge observed 
cannot be reviewed or observed'by reviewing a|written record. The 
applicant's voice tone, her facial expressior|t, her body language, 
her skin tones, her fidgety movements, th<p confidence in her 
answers, the lack of eye contact, all werp determined by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Apparently, in tjiis case, because of 
these things, and the contradictory nature olf her testimony, the 
Administrative Law Judge deemed that Ms. [chambers was not a 
credible witness. These are all items that qannot be reviewed by 
the Appeals Board, and historically are itemq that have not been 
the subject of appeal. Only the Administrative Law Judge, who 
takes the actual evidence and reviews the testimony, is in a 
-3-
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position to feel what is being presented, to see what is being 
presented, and to sense what is being presented. Our Supreme Court 
has stated in the case of Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997): , : 
"We give deference to the initial decision maker on 
questions of fact because it stands in a superior 
position from which to evaluate and weigh evidence and 
assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses' 
recollections." See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994). 
The Appeals Board, by reversing the Administrative Law Judge, 
is attempting to do away with the constitutional hearing process, 
which includes the right to confront witnesses. The ruling of the 
Appeals Board in this particular case in effect is reducing the 
role of the Administrative Law Judge to nothing more than a note 
taker, rather than a trier of fact. The Appeals Board cannot take 
evidence and make credibility determinations, § 34A-1-303 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
It is well settled in Utah that the trier of fact is the only" 
person who can consider the credibility of the witnesses. It is 
never to be overturned unless there is no evidence whatsoever to 
support the Judge's position. In this case, the Appeals Board 
thinks that there was sufficient evidence to support finding that 
there was an accident. The defendants assert that the Appeals 
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Board has applied the wrong standard. Tne standard is not whether 
or not there is any evidence to support the Iposition not found by 
the Judge, but whether or not there is evidence to support the 
position found by the Judge. In this particular case, the Appeals 
Board has relied upon the evidence of the meqlical records and some 
witnesses in verifying that the accident happened. A quick review 
of the evidence clearly shows that the evipence was all solely 
derived from statements made by the applicanp. Therefore, if the 
applicant's credibility is lacking, then it [stands to reason that 
those statements that she made to third partiies is also lacking. 
In short, there is no independent evidence to support the 
applicant's claim. In fact, the only eviderj.ce that supports her 
claim is evidence which she created herself, ay her own statements. 
As mentioned before, even this evidence is contradictory. Her 
statements as to how the accident happened a|ad as to the time of 
day that it happened are all contradictory]. Furthermore, the 
witnesses who were friends of the applicant qlaimed that the sole 
substance of their testimony comes directly fr|om the applicant. It 
was interesting to note that on cross-examJLnation none of the 
witnesses could identify a time or a place or| who else might have 
been present when the alleged statements wer|e made. It is also 
interesting to note that the applicant suffered another accident at 
her other job. No demarcation was made by these witnesses to 
whether these statements were made before or after that accident. 
In conclusion, the action by the Appeals Board in this case 
has reduced the function of the Administrative Law Judge to a 
trivial, meaningless exercise of taking notes of the evidence. To 
take away from the Administrative Law Judge the ability to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses takes away from the 
process the whole purpose and deprives the defendant the 
constitutional right to adequate cross-examination. Furthermore, 
the action of the Appeals Board in determining that there was 
other evidence to support the applicant's statement is misleading 
and illogical. Specifically, "the only other evidence to support 
the applicant's claim were the applicant's statements to other 
persons. 
The defendants submit this motion for reconsideration in order 
to preserve the integrity and significance of the hearing process. 
The defendants submit this motion also to uphold the legitimacy and 
honor of the Administrative Law Judges. They are the initial 
decision maker and should be given deference. By law, only they 
have the ability to make credibility determinations. The 
defendants respectfully submit that the Appeals Board is not 
equipped nor is it in a position to make credibility 
-6-
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determinations. Furthermore, the Appeals Board does not have 
authority to overturn Administrative Law Judgds determinations with 
respect to credibility and the logic utilized in their Order of 
Remand is flawed as the evidence relied upon came solely from the 
applicant's mouth. If the applicant is deemed not credible, then 
neither is the evidence from other sources refliable. 
The Appeals Board is not the Labor Commis|sion and as such must 
only perform reviews as allowed by statute 1 They cannot take 
evidence and therefore "It is not for this Cqurt to determine the 
weight of the evidence and the credibility of| witnesses," Burrell 
v. Industrial Commission, 740 P.2d 1331 (u|:ah 1987), but must 
review the evidence to see if tHe evidence supports the findings of 
the Administrative Law Judge. Accordingly, tqe defendants request 
the Order of the Appeals Board to be set aside! and the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /_$^ day of
 | J^^T 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
^^^z^k^^ 
T^EODOREE KANELL 
A t t o r n e y fcbr D e f e n d a n t s 
ma 
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Aaron J. Prisbrey #6968 
Attorney for Petitioner 
135 North 900 East, Suite #4 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone 801/673-1661 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC. and 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
REPLY TO REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OR ALTERNATE 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 97462 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Glenda Chambers, by and through counsel, Aaron J. Prisbrey, and 
hereby offers this reply to Respondent's Request for Reconsideration or Alternative Motion for 
Review. 
Respondent primarily argues that the Administrative Law Judge should issue findings of fact 
finding Petitioner non-credible and reversing himself. Respondent fails to recognize that this issue 
was already appealed and reversed by the Appeals Board. The findings of the Appeals Board are 
now the 'law of the Case", It would be inappropriate for the Administrative Law Judge to reverse 
his findings of fact in light of the fact the Appeals Board already reversed him on this issue. 
The issues set forth in Respondent's Motion have boon litigated several times. The motion is 
not based upon law or analysis. It is simply argument for the sake of argument. Allegations such 
as those that the "Appeals Board, through clairvoyance, revelation or some extraordinary sixth sense 
has determined that her credibility plays no part in the rulings on these cases..." has no place in a 
legal memoranda. 
In sum, the decision of the Appeals Board remanding this matter was based on sound legal 
reasoning. That decision is now the law of the case, This issue has been briefed and argued on 
several occasions. Respondent has provided inflammatory argument with no new legal analysis as 
to why the decision of the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed. 
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WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests the Administrative La\|v Judge, or alternatively, the Appeals 
Board deny Respondent's motion. 
DATED this \U day of October. 1998. 
Aaron J. rn 
Attorney for 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVKt 
1 hereby certify that I caused to be deposited in the U.S 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument this 16th. day of October, 1998 addressed to the following: 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Hanson Epperson & Wallace, P.C. 
PO Box 2970 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-29270 
Glenda Chambers 
265 East 300 South #7 
St George UT 
Mail, postage prepaid, a true and 
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APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GLENDA C. CHAMBERS, * 
ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC. and 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * Case No. 97-0462 
* 
Defendants. * 
Red Cliffs Regional, Inc. and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Business Insurance 
Company (hereafter referred to jointly as "Red Cliffs"), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's order on remand, awarding benefits to Glenda 
C. Chambers under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah 
Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Is Ms. Chambers entitled to medical expenses and temporary disability compensation for 
injuries suffered while working at Red Cliffs on January 18, 1998? If so, to what extent is Red Cliffs 
liable for such benefits? 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
On June 2, 1997, Ms. Chambers filed an application for hearing with the Labor Commission, 
seeking temporary disability compensation and medical care under the Act for injuries allegedly 
suffered on January 18, 1997 in a work-related accident at Red Cliffs. After an evidentiary hearing, 
the ALJ found that Ms. Chambers had not been involved in the alleged work accident. The ALJ 
therefore dismissed her claim for workers' compensation benefits. 
Ms. Chambers then asked the Appeals Board to review the ALJ's decision. In a decision 
issued September 1, 1998, the Appeals Board concluded that Ms. Chambers had, in fact, suffered a 
work accident at Red Cliffs. The Appeals Board remanded Ms. Chambers' claim to the ALJ "to 
resolve issues of legal and medical causation and the benefits due Ms. Chambers, if any." 
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On September 17, 1998, the ALJ issued his decision on remand concluding that Ms. 
Chambers' injuries were compensable. The ALJ ordered Red Cliffs to pay Ms. Chambers' medical 
expenses for treatment of her back, neck and knees between January 18, 1997 and August 25, 1997. 
The ALJ also ordered Red Cliffs to pay temporary partial disability compensation of $163 per week 
from January 19 through August 25, 1997. 
Red Cliffs now asks the Appeals Board to review the ALJ's decision on remand. Specifically, 
Red Cliffs argues the Appeals Board lacked authority to reverse the ALJ's initial finding that Ms. 
Chambers had not been involved in an accident. Red Cliffs also argues its liability for Ms. Chambers' 
medical expenses should end on March 25, 1997, when she was involved in a second accident while 
working for a different employer. Finally, Red Cliffs argues Ms. Chambers is not entitled to any 
temporary disability compensation because she rejected Red Cliffs' offer of light duty work. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
As of January 18, 1997, Ms. Chambers was concurrently employed by both Red Cliffs and 
Washington County ARC ("ARC" hereafter). On January 18, 1997, while working at Red Cliffs, 
she attempted to lift a patient into a wheel chair. The patient, who lacked control over her muscles 
and weighed about 200 pounds, fell forward from the wheel chair. As Ms. Chambers tried to catch 
the patient, she fell backward with the patient on top of her. 
As a result of the foregoing accident, Ms. Chambers experienced pain in her back, neck and 
knees. She sought emergency medical treatment that evening. The emergency room physician 
diagnosed "lumbar myofascial strain." He prescribed medication and physical therapy, and released 
Ms. Chambers to return to light duty work on January 20, 1997. Ms. Chambers received additional 
medical care from other physicians over the next several weeks. She was diagnosed with 
lumbosacral, cervical and upper thoracic strain/sprain injury, superimposed on preexisting 
degenerative lumbar spine disease. These physicians continued her light duty release for work. 
Ms. Chambers advised Red Cliffs of her light duty release, but was not offered such work. 
However, she was provided light duty work at ARC, where she continued to work until August 1997. 
She then left her work at ARC for reasons unrelated to her injuries. 
During the week immediately preceding her accident of January 18, 1997, Ms. Chambers 
earned $308.27 at Red Cliffs. During the same time, she earned $103.13 at ARC. After January 18, 
1997, Ms. Chambers earned an average of $189.49 per week at ARC. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As a preliminary matter, Red Cliffs argues the Appeals Board is bound by the ALJ's findings 
of fact, particularly when based on the ALJ's view of witness credibility. However, the 
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Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), the Labor Commission Act, and prior appellate decisions 
all establish the Appeals Board's authority to determine the facts of cases that come before it. 
Section 63-46b-12 (4)(c) of UAPA specifically provides that the Appeals Board shall issue 
an order that contains "findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed," and "whether the decision 
of the (ALT) is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified . . . ." Likewise, §34A-l-303(4)(a) of the Labor 
Commission Act authorizes the Appeals Board to "reverse the findings, conclusions, and decisions 
of an administrative law judge." Finally, in U.S. Steel v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807, 811 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the authority of the Industrial Commission1 to 
substitute its findings of fact for those of an ALJ: 
We hold, therefore, that the Commission, sitting en banc, if it deems that 
further evidence is not necessary, need not hold further hearings, and in its review of 
the record made before the Administrative Law Judge, may make its own findings on 
the credibility of the evidence presented. The Commission's findings so made will not 
be disturbed by this Court if they are supported by substantial evidence. 
Pursuant to the foregoing authority, the Appeals Board concludes that it has both the right 
and the duty to apply its own judgment in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
Appeals Board will consider the merits of Red Cliffs' motion for review accordingly. 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides disability compensation and medical benefits 
to employees who have been injured by accident arising out of and in the course of their employment. 
(See §34A-2-401 of the Act.) The threshold issue in this case is whether Ms. Chambers was injured 
by accident at Red Cliffs on January 18, 1997. Having twice reviewed the entire record, the Appeals 
Board reaffirms its prior determination that Ms. Chambers was, in fact, injured in such an accident. 
The next question is whether Ms. Chambers' injuries "arise out of and in the course o f her 
employment at Red Cliffs. This in turn requires consideration of both the legal and medical causes 
of her injuries. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
Ms. Chambers suffered from preexisting degenerative lumbar spine disease prior to her 
accident at Red Cliffs on January 18, 1997. Consequently, she must meet the "higher" test for legal 
causation set forth in Allen. To meet this test, she must establish that her injuries resulted from a 
1
 At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. Steel v. Industrial Commission, the 
Commission served the same function that is now performed by the Appeals Board. Since the 
date of the Court's decision in U.S. Steel, UAPA has been enacted and the Workers' 
Compensation Act has been recodified and amended. Each of these statutory changes has been 
consistent with the Court's holding in U.S. Steel, quoted above. 
. • • • . - . • • i . . . . . • • • . ' • • • 
00309 
i 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
GLENDA CHAMBERS 
PAGE 4 
work-related exertion that is "unusual or extraordinary" when compared to the typical exertions 
encountered in modern, nonemployment life. The record establishes that Ms. Chambers attempted 
to catch a 200 pound patient as the patient fell from her wheel chair. In the process, Ms. Chambers 
fell to the floor, with the patient on top of her. The Appeals Board concludes that this event exceeds 
the.typical exertions of modern nonemployment life and therefore satisfies the test of legal causation. 
With respect to the requirement of medical causation, the medical records establish that Ms. 
Chambers' work accident of January 18, 1997 produced lumbosacral, cervical and upper thoracic 
strain/sprain injury, superimposed on preexisting degenerative lumbar spine disease. The record 
contains no contrary medical opinion. The Appeals Board therefore concludes that Ms. Chambers 
has established medical causation. 
In light of the foregoing, the Appeals Board finds that Ms. Chambers is entitled to medical 
benefits and disability compensation for the injuries she suffered from her accident at Red Cliffs on 
January 18, 1997. Because Ms. Chambers was able to continue working for ARC after the accident, 
the Appeals Board concurs with the AJLTs conclusion that Ms. Chambers is entitled to temporary 
partial disability compensation, rather than temporary total disability compensation. However, the 
ALJ's mathematical computation overstates the amount of such compensation.2 The Appeals Board 
concludes that Ms. Chambers is entitled to temporary partial disability compensation of $149 per 
week. 
Finally, Red Cliffs argues that Ms. Chambers is not entitled to any temporary disability 
compensation because she refused Red Cliffs' offer of suitable light duty work. The Appeals Boa^ 
has carefully considered the evidence presented on this point during the evidentiary hearing. Based 
on the hearing record, the Appeals Board finds no evidence that Red Cliffs offered light duty work 
to Ms. Chambers, or that Ms. Chambers refused any light duty work with Red Cliffs. Red Cliffs also 
argues that Ms. Chambers' medical care after March 1997 was necessitated by a second industrial 
accident she suffered while working at ARC. The record contains no evidence to support this 
argument. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Board denies Red Cliffs ' motion for review and affirms 
the order of the ALJ, as modified below: 
2
 The ALJ determined that Ms. Chambers worked 46.75 hours at Red Cliffs during the 
week immediately preceding her injury and that she earned $6.15 per hour. Consequently, her 
weekly earnings at Red Cliffs were $287.51, rather than the $308.27 calculated by the ALJ. This 
correction results in a temporary partial compensation rate of $149 per week, rather than $163 
per week as awarded by the ALJ. 
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Red Cliffs Regional and Business Insurance Company shall pay the medical and travel 
expenses necessary to treatment Glenda Chambers' lumbar, cervical and knee injuries from January 
18 through August 25, 1997, such payments to made according to Utah Labor Commission rules. 
Red Cliffs Regional and Business Insurance Company shall pay temporary partial disability 
compensation to Glenda Chambers at the rate of $149 per week from January 19 through August 25 
1997, plus interest at 8% per annum from the date each weekly payment was due. Such payment 
shall be made in a lump sum, with 20% of that amount paid directly to Aaron Prisbrey as his fee for 
services as Ms. Chambers' attorney. The balance shall be paid directly to Ms. Chambers. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this Id day of November, 1998. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Gienda C. Chambers, Case No. 97-0462, was mailed first class postage prepaid this / l ^day of 
November, 1998, to the following: 
GLENDA C. CHAMBERS 
12660 TRIPLE TREE TER 
VICTORVILLE CA 923 92-93 91 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC. 
1745 EAST 280. NORTH 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY 
P O BOX 18730 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118-0730 
THEODORE KANELL, ESQ. 
P O BOX 2970 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2970 
AARON J. PRISBREY, ESQ. 
135 NORTH 900 EAST #4 
ST. GEORGE UT 84770 
Sara Jenspf 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
Orders\97-0462b 
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THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorney for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, 
Applicant, 
v. 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC., and 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
The Defendant, Red Cliff Regional Inc. and its insurance 
carrier, Business Insurance Company, hereby requests that the Board 
of Appeals reconsider its order denying the motion for review on 
one particular issue. The particular issue requested is the award 
of temporary total disability after March 27, 1997. Specifically, 
there is no medical evidence whatsoever to support a claim for 
temporary total disability after March 27, 1997. In fact, the 
applicant received no medical treatment whatsoever after March 27, 
1997. The applicant testified that she had no sums to receive 
treatment, but nevertheless testified that she was on Medicaid at 
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the time. In fact, she had been on Medicaid for quite some time as 
the record showed. 
The law in this state is that temporary total disability is 
only payable until the applicant or injured employee stabilizes. 
Clearly, the applicant or injured stabilized after her last medical 
treatment because her condition did not improve or decrease within 
a percentage of 3% or more over the next little time. In fact, the 
applicant's only testimony was that she worked full time at her 
other job up and through August 25, 1997, when she decided to move 
to Las Vegas. Luckily, for the defendant, she decided to move as 
that at least became a cut off date. Otherwise, I guess it is 
conceivable that this Board of Appeals would have ruled that she 
was entitled to temporary total disability through the end of her 
existence. Nevertheless, the Board of Appeals has determined that 
payment of medical bills should proceed through August 25, the date 
that she left for Las Vegas. In fact, there are no medical bills 
after March 27, 1997. Therefore, there should be no medical bills 
payable after March 27, 1997. Furthermore, temporary total 
disability should not be payable after March 27, 1997, as the 
applicant has submitted no medical proof to show that her condition 
was either worsening or getting better and, in fact, the logical 
assumption to be made is that on the date of her last medical 
-2-
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treatment she was stabilized. Furthermore, she had another 
industrial accident with her new job on or about that date. 
These defendants respectfully request that the Board of 
Appeals reconsider the matter and issue an appropriate order at 
least that somewhat follows the facts of this case. Furthermore, 
these defendants wonder why the Board of Appeals heard this last 
Motion for Review when there was no indication that it must go to 
the Board of Appeals. Specifically, after Judge Sims issued his 
order, the defendants asked Judge Sims to reconsider his position 
and if not to consider this matter as a motion for review. No 
request was made, either by the Applicant or these defendants, that 
this matter go to the Board of Appeals. In fact, it was considered 
that the whole matter should go to the Labor Commissioner in his 
rightful role as the head of the Labor Commission. Nobody 
requested that the Board of Appeals, which is once removed from the 
Labor Commission, and which does not seem to understand its role as 
and Appeals Board, review this matter. The procedure has been 
totally circumvented by the Board of Appeals taking jurisdiction 
over this matter when nobody requested it. 
These defendants further request an extension of time in which 
to file an appeal to the Court of Appeals until such time as this 
Board can determine whether or not it even had jurisdiction to hear 
-3-
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this matter and if it can reconsiaer che issues that they have 
ruled upon. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X V day of A ^ ' 1998. 
PLANT. WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
ma 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was 
iled, postage prepaid, this 7M day of rJ0 1/ , 1998, 
to the following: 
Aaron J. Prisbrey 
135 North 900 East, Suite #4 
St. George, UT 84770 
r W w ^ mAfu^^i^^^ 
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Red Cliffs Regional, Inc. and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Business Insurance 
Company (referred to jointly as "Red Cliffs" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission to reconsider its prior decision awarding benefits to Glenda Chambers under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-13.1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Red Cliffs contends 1) the Appeals Board lacks jurisdiction in this proceeding, and 2) Ms. 
Chambers is not entitled to disability compensation after March 27, 1997. 
DISCUSSION 
With respect to the Appeals Board's jurisdiction, §34xA-l-303 establishes the manner in 
which the parties may elect to obtain Appeals Board review of a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge. If none of the parties makes such an election, the review is conducted by the Utah Labor 
Commissioner. No particular form is required for such a request. In this case, Ms. Chambers elected 
Appeals Board review in the final sentence of her reply to Red Cliffs' motion for review, dated 
October 16, 1998, which stated: "Wherefore, Petitioner requests the Administrative Law Judge or 
1
 The Appeals Board notes with sorrow the death of Stephen J. Beeley on December 25, 
1998. The remaining members of the Board will proceed to consider the pending request for 
reconsideration pursuant to §34A-l-205(6), which provides that "(a) majority of the board shall 
constitute a quorum to transact business." 
GLENDA CHAMBERS, * 
Applicant, * 
* 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC., and * 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY, * 
Defendants. * 
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alternatively, the Appeals Board deny Respondent's motion." The Appeals Board thereby obtained 
jurisdiction to decide Red Cliffs' motion for review, as well as Red Cliffs subsequent request for 
reconsideration. 
As to Red Cliffs' contention that the evidence does not support Ms. Chambers' claim for 
compensation after March 27, 1997, the Appeals Board notes that Red Cliffs contends "there is no 
medical evidence whatsoever to support a claim for temporary total disability after March 27, 1997." 
Red Cliffs' reference to temporary total disability compensation is in error. Ms. Chambers has, in 
fact, been awarded temporary partial disability compensation. The Appeals Board fiirther notes that 
Ms. Chambers was restricted to light duty work following her accident of January 18, 1997. Red 
Cliffs has presented no evidence that Ms. Chambers' light duty restrictions ended by March 27, 
1997. Consequently, the Appeals Board finds no basis to terminate her temporary partial disability 
compensation as of that date. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board reaffirms its prior decisions in this matter and denies Red Cliffs request 
for reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this day of January, 1999. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For 
Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the 
matter of Glenda Chambers, Case No. 97-0462, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this _/5^day 
of January, 1999, to the following: 
GLENDA C. CHAMBERS 
12660 TRIPLE TREE TER 
VICTORVILLE CA 92392-9391 
RED CLIFFS REGIONAL, INC. 
1745 EAST 280 NORTH 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY 
PO BOX 18730 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84118-0730 
THEODORE KANELL, ESQ. 
PO BOX 2970 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2970 
AARON J. PRISBEY, ESQ. 
135 NORTH 900 EAST #4 
ST. GEORGE UT 84770 
Sara Jensen 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
ah/mr/heading/97-0462r-2 
